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Article 2

Justice Byron White and the Argument that
the Greater Includes the Lesser
Michael Herz*
The proposition that the greater includes the lesser is
tremendously attractive to lawyers and judges. It satisfies the
desire for logic, proof, and coherence. It sounds right.
It is also a trap. That does not mean that it is always false.
Were that so, it would not be much of a trap. It is a trap
because it is only sometimes true.
In this Article, I will consider Justice Byron White's use of
the greater-includes-the-lesserargument. I have two goals. The
first is to learn something more about White; the second is t o
learn something more about legal argument. I suggest that
White is fond of the greater-includes-the-lesser argument,'
which represents a style of logical reasoning that is typical of
his opinions but is often overlooked by commentators. While
the argument holds great appeal for White, he has for the most
part successfully avoided its traps.
Part I begins with some general observations on Justice
White's jurisprudence, agreeing with the usual portrait of
White as a pragmatic functionalist, but suggesting that that
portrait is incomplete. White is a keenly analytic thinker who
is interested not only in how things work in practice but also in
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; law clerk to
Justice White, 1983 and 1984 Terms. My thanks to Susan Bandes, Eva Hanks,
John McGinnis, and Kevin Worthen for comments on an earlier draft, to Larry
Crocker and Abner Greene for helpful conversations, and to Eric Rethy (Cardozo
'93) and Michael Jaffe (Cardozo '94) for very useful research.
1. Early drafts of this Article fluctuated hopelessly between the present and
past tense when discussing Justice White's opinions. His retirement from the
Supreme Court suggested that the past tense was correct, but using it did not
come naturally and I frequently lapsed into the more reassuring present tense. I
then came to the happy realization that because Justice White continues his
judicial activity, sitting by designation on the Courts of Appeals, see, e.g., 114 S.
Ct. No. 8, at cliii (1994) (designating Justice White to sit on the Tenth Circuit
from March 14 through March 18, 1994), use of the present tense remains correct
except when specifically referring to his Supreme Court tenure.
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how they hold together in theory. Part I1 discusses the contours
and limitations of the logical proposition that the greater
includes the lesser. Part I11 then applies that discussion to
White opinions that invoke the greater-includes-the-lesser
argument.

A. Legal Functionalism
Most accounts of Byron White's jurisprudence emphasize
White's pragmatic functionalism. For example, Alan Ides' insightful recent essay portrays White as the inheritor of the
legal realism preached at the Yale Law School when he was a
student there, eschewing formalist distinctions and blindered
doctrinalism in favor of a pragmatic, functionalist consideration
of real-world circumstance^.^
In a similar vein, Lance Liebman writes of White:
His job, as he saw it, was to decide cases: to read the briefs,
to question the lawyers rigorously, to find the flaws in general
statements about the law, and to see, as far a s humanly possible, the consequences of each decision and its supporting
rationale. Thus his powedul intelligence was largely focused
on predicting, skeptically, the consequences of conclusion and
reason-the consequences for other applications of a rule, and
the real-world consequences of a Supreme Court de~ision.~

The separation-of-powers dissents-Buckley
v. Valeo;
Bowsher v. Synar,' Northern Pipeline Construction Co. u. Marathon Pipe Line Co.; Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc.,?

2. Allan Ides, The Jurisprudence of Justice Byron White, 103 YALE L.J. 419
(1993).
3. Lance Liebman, A Tribute to Justice Byron R. White, 107 HARV. L. REV.
13, 14 (1993); see also Kate Stith, Byron R. White, Last of the New Deal Liberals,
103 YALEL.J. 19, 19 (1993) (noting that "[tlo the distress of those who would have
preferred greater elaboration of a philosophical vision, he approached the judicial
task in a lawyerly and pragmatic fashion").
4. 424 U.S. 1, 257 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and dissepting in
part).
5. 478 U.S. 714, 759 (1986) (White,J., dissenting).
6. 458 US. 50, 92 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
7. 111 S. Ct. 2298, 2312 (1991) (White, J., dissenting); see id. at 2312-13
("Today the Court strikes down yet another innovative and otherwise lawful governmental experiment in the name of separation of powers.").

THE GREATER INCLUDES THE LESSER
and, of course, INS u. Chadhas-are the most celebrated examThis approach is "realist" both
ples of White's fun~tionalism.~
in the jurisprudential sense and in the sense that it pays serious attention to the real world. In a phrase of Justice Jackson's
that White quoted more than once, the goal was to achieve not
abstract purity or theoretical elegance but a "workable government."1°
8. 462 U.S. 919, 967 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
9. See Ides, supra note 2, at 421-29; Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers QuestioneA Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987). Indeed, here is where one finds arguably its single starkest expression. In Bowsher v. Synar the majority concluded that the Comptroller
General was subservient to Congress because he could be removed by an a d of
Congress. 478 US. at 727-28. For White, the removal power was a "triviality" of
"minimal practical significance" that had "lain dormant" for six decades. Id. at 759,
765, 771 (White, J., dissenting). Indeed, "[tlhe practical result of the removal provision is not to render the Comptroller unduly dependent upon or subservient to
Congress, but to render him one of the most independent officers in the entire
federal establishment." Id. at 773 (White, J., dissenting). "Realistic consideration of
the nature of the Comptroller General's relation to Congress thus reveals that the
threat to separation of powers conjured up by the majority is wholly chimerical."
Id. at 774 (White, J., dissenting). In utter contrast, Chief Justice Burger wrote for
the majority that whether in practice the Comptroller General was a pawn of Congress was simply irrelevant: "In constitutional terms, the removal powers over the
Comptroller General's office dictate that he will be subservient to Congress." Id. at
730.
White's approach in these cases was replicated in his opinions in "vertical separation of powersn (i.e. federalism) cases. There he also emphasized the need for
flexibility to enable government to handle real and changing problems and deference to better-informed branches, focusing on overall structure and displaying impatience with the Court's attachment to purely formal requirements at the expense
of their underlying rationales. One of the purest and most explicit examples of this
approach came during his second-to-last Term in White's partial dissent in New
York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). The Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Act required states to take title to such waste if they failed to ensure adequate
disposal opportunities. In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court struck down
the take-title provision as an unconstitutional "commandeering" of the organs of
state government by the feds. Taking the majority to task for its "formalistically
rigid obeisance to 'federalism,'" id. at 2446 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), White emphasized that "action, rather than rhetoric, is needed to
solve" what had become "a crisis of national proportions," and it thus "would be
far more sensible to defer to a coordinate branch of government ill its decision to
devise a solution to a national problem of this kind," id. at 2444 & n.3 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The upshot of the Court's opinion, he
argued, would be at best to force Congress to jump through additional hoops to
achieve the same result and might well be less rather than more state decisionmaking and autonomy. Id. at 2446 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
10. The quote is from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 US.
579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring), and was invoked by White in his dissents
in Bowsher, 478 US. at 760 (White, J., dissenting), and Chadha, 462 US. at 978
(White, J., dissenting).
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'White's function- and fact-oriented approach to jurispru- .
dence,"" as Ides shows, is hardly limited to the separation of
powers cases. To Ides' catalogue, I would add one category and
four examples. The category is White's preference for as-applied
rather than facial constitutional challenges.12 An as-applied
challenge (a) is narrower than a facial challenge and (b) rests
on hard facts about the real world rather than judicial hypothesizing about possible applications.
My four examples concern four superficially unrelated
cases that can be lumped together because each forced the
Court explicitly to describe the role of judges.13 In Chisom v.
Roemer,14Justice White joined the Court's opinion, written by
Justice Stevens, holding that the Voting Rights Act applies to
elections for judges, notwithstanding the statute's application
only t o elections for "representatives." In Gregory v. A~hcroft,'~
he wrote separately, joined only by Justice Stevens, concluding
that judges are "on the policymaking level" and therefore not
within the protection of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act. In Payne v. Tennessee,16White joined the Court's opinion,
written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, overruling two recent decisions and permitting the introduction of victim-impact evidence
in capital trials. White had dissented in the first decision,"
then made a fiRh vote to stand by that decision in the second,'' before returning to his original substantive position in

11. Ides, supra note 2, at 437; see also Pierce O'Donnell, Common Sense and
the Constitution: Justice White and the Egalitarian Ideal, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 433,
434 (1987) (describing White's judicial approach as "fundamentally pragmatic, rather than ideological, principled but nondoctrinaire").
12. My assertion that White had such a preference is based on impression
more than research. For one example, however, see Reme v. Geary, 111 S. Ct.
2331 (1991). The majority dismissed without reaching the merits; Justices White
and Marshall wrote separately, addressing the merits. Viewing the case as a facial
challenge, Marshall would have struck the statute down, id. at 2350 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); viewing it as an as-applied challenge White would have upheld the
statute, id. at 2342 (White, J., dissenting).
13. I have thus lumped them together. See Michael Herz, Choosing Between
Normative and Descriptive Versions of the Judicial Role, 75 M A R Q U ~L.E REV.
725 (19921, on which the following discussion draws.
14. 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991).
15. 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2408 (1991) (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part; and concurring in the judgment).
16. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
17. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 515 (1987) (White, J., dissenting).
18. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 US. 805, 812 (1989) (White, J., dissenting).
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Payne. Finally, in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,lg
White was in a group of three Justices who concluded that
because the Court had applied the new rule announced in a
, ~the
~ parties
prior decision, Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. D i a ~ to
in Bacchus, fairness required that the rule be applied retroactively across the board. Three Justices would have applied the
Bacchus rule prospectively, and three (the unusual cluster of
Marshall, Blackmun, and Scalia) contended that judicial decisions must always be retroactive.
Justice White's votes in these cases are ideologically inconsistent. For example, he voted for the civil rights plaintiffs in
Chisom but against them in Gregory-unlike, say, Justices
Blackmun and Marshall, who voted for the plaintiffs in both.
He voted against the criminal defendant, but also against the
big corporation, unlike most of the other Justices, who voted
either against the criminal defendant and for the corporation or
vice versa. He read one ambiguous federal statute to apply t o
state governments and one not to, unlike Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Scalia, who read both to
leave the states alone. Ideology, however, is always the wrong
criterion for evaluating or understanding White's opinions.
Viewed as the application of a single methodology and view of
the judiciary, these four votes are wholly and uniquely consistent.
Each of these cases required a choice between an idealized,
normative version of the judicial role and a realistic, descriptive version. The one portrays courts as modest dispute resolvers, faithfully applying legal rules made by others; the other
deems judges active lawmakers. Alone among the Justices,
White opted for the descriptive version in each of these cases-he always chose reality over theory.21He was one of only
two Justices who was willing to come right out and say that
19. 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2448 (1991).
20. 468 U.S.263 (1984).
21. In contrast, for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist endorsed an essentially
legislative role for the Court in Payne and Jim Beam, unfazed by overruling prior
decisions or ruling prospectively, but then joined Justice O'Connor's tentative majority opinion in Gregory (holding only that judges were not clearly not on the
policymaking level) and in Chisom refused t o accept that judges could be "representatives." Justices Marshall and Blackmun painted an extraordinarily conservative
picture of judges as wholly deferential to the policymakers in other branches, as
absolutely bound by precedent, and as constitutionally obliged to rule retroactively,
only to hold that these diffident dispute-resolvers were "representatives" under the
Voting Rights Act. And so on.
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judges are policymakers; he joined the majority that endorsed
the "representatives" label; he saw no constitutional imperative
of retroactive decisionmaking; and he joined a majority that
gave short shrift to the principles of stare decisis. In short, he
consistently went along with an image of the judiciary that is a
good deal closer to the model of a legislature-representative
policymakers who decide matters prospectively and without
regard for prior decisions-than the "official version" would
have it.22 This version is, of course, that of the realists.23
22. Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia, the current Court's leading formalist, was
almost as consistent in adhering to the opposite version of the judicial role. For
him, judges are wholly unlike legislators: they are not representatives, may not
make policy, and must decide retroactively. Scalia's vote in Payne (the one case in
this group where he and White joined the same opinion) is the aberration on this
account, although it is a minor one given the conflicting signals of the usual normative version of the judicial role: adhere to precedent, but also defer to ultimate
binding legal standards, such as those set out in the Constitution.
23. In light of Justice White's uniquely consistent approach in these cases, I
cannot resist offering a few words at this point on the question of White's consistency, or lack thereof. It is striking to what extent the standard perception is that
White was quite inconsistent, both on the macro level (the usual charge being that
he grew ever more conservative over the years and would have been a sore disappointment to the President who appointed him) and on the micro level (it often
being observed that he was "unpredictable"). All former clerks have had the "isn't
he getting more conservative" conversation a million times. And it is a standard
observation that, in Chief Justice Rehnquist's words, "his judicial work defies easy
categorization" and "no 'Byron R. White School of Jurisprudence' remains behind."
L.J. 5,
William H. Rehnquist, A Tribute to Justice Byron R. White, 33 WASHBURN
5, 6 (1993).
To me (and, I think, to most former clerks, see, e.g., Rex E. Lee, A Case for
Whizzer White's' Greatness, NAT'L L.J., May 31, 1993, at 17) all this is quite mystifying. First of all, except in the area of affirmative action, see Charles Fried, A
Tribute to Justice Byron R. White, 107 HARV. L. REV.20, 20 (1993) (noting that
White joined opinions in affirmative action cases that were "clearly, even provocatively, inconsistent"); Lance Liebman, Justice White and Affirmative Action, 58 U.
COLO.L. REV. 471 (1987) (describing shifts in White's views on affvmative action),
White did not shift noticeably to the right over the years. In the area of criminal
procedure, where the Court was most visibly conservative over White's last decade
on it, he merely stayed to the right, where he had begun (dissenting, for example,
in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 526 (1966) (White, J., dissenting), and
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 495 (1964) (White, J., dissenting)) and where the
Court came to join him. Indeed, when the Court lurched even further t o the right
than he had been, he refused to go with it. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
U.S. 279, 288-95 (1991) (plurality opinion of White, J., joined by Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.) (dissenting from application of harmless-error rule to
introduction of coerced confessions). In the substantive due process area, he was
skeptical from the start (dissenting in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 541 (1977) (White, J., dissenting), and every abortion decision beginning with
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting)) but not openly hostile (going along in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US. 479, 502 (1965) (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment), and consistently arguing for parental liberty interests).
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This is not to say that White was endorsing a wide-ranging
judicial activism. He was not, and he did not display such tendencies himself. On the other hand, for all the talk about his
deference to the democratic process, he is not shy about interfering with it.24And he always has frankly acknowledged the
broad scope of the judicial power to do SO, even when he
thought it was being unwisely exercised.25What mattered to
him in these cases, then, was how judges functioned in the real
world, what they "did in fact."26
The same description applies to his First Amendment opinions from the start. On
the other hand (again, excepting affirmative action) he was consistently in the
liberal camp in equal protection cases, and Voting Rights Act plaintiffs had no
greater friend on the Court.
Not only are these positions consistent over time, they are easily squared one
with another. As others have described, the dominant themes are deference to
democratically accountable andlor expert decisionmakers, an effort to ensure that
democratic processes work effectively, scrutiny to ensure that other governmental
players are doing their jobs correctly, and a pragmatic flexibility.
Oddly, he was perhaps most inconsistent in his approach to consistency. That
is, more than most Justices he would accept rulings from which he had dissented
as binding precedent. Here and there, however, he never gave in. He was a consistent dissenter in cases involving separation of powers, abortion, and the religion
clauses. I am not sure what determined when White accepted precedent he deemed
wrongly decided and when he held fast to his dissenting view. My tentative speculation is that he was more likely to perpetuate a dissenting position when he was
isolated. This seems perverse, but may reflect his strong sense of institutional
obligation. A Justice is freer to chart his own course when the Court does not
need him to chart its course. On White's sense of institutional obligation, see, e.g.,
Fried, supra, at 23 (noting White9s "willingness to go along to 'make a Court'-a
subordination of personal punctilio to the goal of making the Court's work useful
to, not to say usable by, the lower courts and the professionn); Monroe E. Price,
White: A Justice of Studied Unpredictability, NAT'LL.J., Feb. 18, 1980, a t 24, 25
(stating that White "believes deeply in performing proficiently his assignment as a
judge on a court that can perform what is expected of itn).
24. See Liebman, supra note 3, at 15-16 (noting examples of White's willingness to intrude on legislative choice); see also infm note 41.
25. His dissent in Miranah provides the classic example:
[Tbe Court is making] new law and new public policy in much the same
way that it has in the course of interpreting other great clauses of the
Constitution. This is what the Court . . . must do and will continue to do
until and unless there is some fundamental change in the constitutional
distribution of governmental powers.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 531 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
26. Less strikingly, these decisions reflect a second oft-noted aspect of White's
jurisprudence: deference to and confidence in democratic decisionmaking. Chisom is
one of many cases in which White voted for a strong reading of the Voting Rights
Act; Payne one of many in which he took a narrow reading of constitutional limitations on the political branches; Jim Beam one of many in which he endorsed onerous judicial remedies once a statutory or constitutional violation had been found.
There is no shortage of examples. On this aspect of White's opinions, see Ides,
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B. Logical Fornalism
I wholly agree, then, with the usual account of Justice
White's jurisprudence, as far as it goes. I also feel, however,
that it is incomplete. It leaves out Justice White's extraordinary abilities as an abstract thinker. In his final opinion as a
Supreme Court Justice, a partial concurrence and partial dissent in United States v. Dixon?' White criticized the
majority's approach as having "consequences [that are] at once
illogical and harmful."28This phrase captures the second aspect of White's judicial method: he sought t o avoid not just
harmful outcomes but also illogical ones.
Notwithstanding White's disdain for ungrounded theorizing:'
and legal functionalist though he may have been, he
was in many ways a logical formalist. His pragmatism may
have led to or at least is part of the first; his analytic abilities
and interest in argument led to or at least are part of the second.
While perhaps he is "as far as you can get from [being]
flamboyant, dramatic or even eloquent,'"' Byron White is, to
use a phrase he often applies t o others, "smart as hell." This is
a recurrent and unsurprising theme of the recollections of former clerks. For example, Bill Nelson notes Justice White's
"extraordinary analytical ability" and states that "[iln my experience as his law clerk, I found that Justice White could identify the weaknesses and gaps in any theoretical argu~nent."~'

supra note 2, at 456-58.
27. 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2868 (1993) (White, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
28. Id. at 2877 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
29. In addition to the sources cited above, see supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text, consider this typical expression of such exasperation: "Surely, even at
the extreme level of abstraction a t which the Court operates in its opinion, the
majority can recognize a difference between the scope and dangers of [laws that
had been struck down in prior cases], and Lakewood's more focused regulation."
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 US. 750, 787 (1988) (White,
J., dissenting); see also Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 US. 490, 521
(1981) (plurality opinion of White, J.) (stating that the dissent's "position makes
little sense even abstractly").
30. Donald W. Hoagland, Byron White as a Practicing Lazuyer in Colorado, 58
U. COLO. L. REV. 365, 366 (1987).
31. William E. Nelson, Deference and the Limits to Deference in the Constitutional Jurisprudence of Justice Byron R. White, 58 U . COLO. L '2EV. 347, 348
(1987). Judge David Ebel, another former clerk, notes that Justice White "simply
does not need much processing time t o absorb and integrate information. A brief
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The Justice has an "analytic bent of mind"32and admires and
possesses the debater's facility with argument.33
Others who have tussled with him share this impression.
Former Solicitor General Charles Fried writes:
It is not possible to have seen Justice White in the courtroom,
to have argued before him, without getting a sense of a strong
intelligence. He knew the case. He had worked out its intricacies-he obviously loves a puzzle. He delighted in asking just
the question that displayed a weakness the advocate was trying to skate over, or perhaps had not even noticed. "Skewer"
is the word that comes to mind,34

It would be odd if this analytical skill and inclination did'
not in some way surface in his jurisprudence. I think it does.
Consider one example by way of introduction. Justice White
shows a particular thoughtfulness about means/ends tests,
often focusing on whether a particular rule or statute served its
stated purposes. In a number of the Warren Court individual

statement travels fully clothed into his consciousness with all of the trappings of
nuance, comparison, structure, and context that, for most of us, require articulated
analysis and, even more importantly, time." David M. Ebel, A Tribute to Justice
Byron R. White, 107 HARV. L. REV. 8, 11 (1993).
32. Stith, supra note 3, at 19.
33. As Lance Liebman wrote more than two decades ago, ''White is a brilliant
lawyer, quick and imaginative a t seeing and making arguments." Lance Liebman,
Swing Man on the Supreme Court, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 8, 1972, 8 6 (Magazine), a t 16,
17. It has always been my impression that a disproportionate number of his law
clerks were on the debate team at some point. One former clerk recalls:
The Justice was the consummate debater. No one could ever accuse
him of political correctness in his thinking. I marvelled at his nimble
mind, command of history, and willingness to push the outside of the
envelope to test his acolytes' glib assumptions. I have never met anyone
who could so cogently and ~conornicallymarshal the fads and law.
Our debates were nothing if not intense. Arguing with the Justice was
like taking the bar examination in a hurricane. The man who graduated
first in his high school, college, and law school classes used all of his
awesome intellectual powers to make his points.
Pierce O'Do~ell,The Hands of Justice: A Law Clerk Fondly Remembers Byron R.
White, 33 WASHBURNL.J. 12, 17 (1993).
34. Fried, supra note 23, at 22. Fried's predecessor Erwin Griswold ascribes
White's "appearance of brusqueness" to the fad that "his mind is so clear and
quick." Erwin N. Griswold, Reflections on Justice White, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 339,
346 (1987); see also Stuart Taylor Jr., Justice Byron White: The Consistent Curmudgeon, LEGALTIMES,Mar. 22, 1993, at 1, 30 ('White's personal crustiness is that of
a man of enormous intelligence-a Rhodes Scholar who was at the top of his Yale
Law School class and who arguably boasts as much sheer intellectual horsepower
as anyone on the Courtwho seemingly cannot be bothered to spend much effort
seeking to persuade others to his point of view.").
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liberties cases, for example, Justice White went along with the
result, but focused on means and ends, without joining in any
sweeping statements about the Constitution. Thus, in Griswold
v. C o n n e ~ t i c u tWhite
~~
voted with the majority. While acknowledging an unenumerated privacy right as part of a substantive due process liberty interest, his opinion was directed
primarily to whether the ban on the use of contraceptives by
married couples would in fact further the stated goal:

I wholly fail to see how the ban on the use of contraceptives by
married couples in any way reinforces the State's ban on illicit
sexual relationships. . . .
. . . Perhaps the theory is that the flat ban on use prevents
married people from possessing contraceptives and without the
ready availability of such devices for use in the marital relationship, there will be no or less temptation to use them in
extramarital ones. This reasoning rests on the premise that
married people will comply with the ban in regard to their
marital relationship, notwithstanding total nonenforcement i n
this context and apparent nonenforcibility, but will not comply
with criminal statutes prohibiting extramarital affairs and the
anti-use statute in respect to illicit sexual relationships, a
premise whose validity has not been demonstrated and whose
intrinsic validity is not very evident.36
This is not just a "let's look a t the real world, folks" opinion. It
is carefully reasoned, somewhat abstract, and logically complex.
White's concern is whether the state's argument holds together
on its face.
Close examination of the means and ends can be seen in
his opinion in United States v. Leon:'
which established a
"good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule under which
evidence obtained in good faith by a police officer reasonably
relying on an invalid warrant is admissible. White, never enthusiastic about the exclusionary rule, had advocated such an
exception for some time before a majority joined him in
Leon.38 The reasoning in Leon rests not on empirical investi35. 381 U S . 479 (1965).
36. Id. at 505-07 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
37. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
38. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 266 (1983) (White, J., concurring
in the judgment); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539-40 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
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gation but on a theory about the purpose of the exclusionary
rule and the circumstances in which that purpose will be
served by excluding illegally obtained evidence. For White, the
critical point was that "[plenalizing the officer for the
magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment ~iolations."~~
The same attention to the meandends connection is seen
in White's willingness, probably somewhat greater than that of
most Justices:' to strike down laws under rational basis scrutiny:' and in his well-known opinion in the air-bags case."2
In all these examples, I would suggest, something more
than "functionalism" or "legal realism" is at work. White is
neither a policy wonk in robes, nor an Earl Warren, nor a Louis Brandeis (the brief-writer or the Justice). He is an exceptionally intelligent and keenly analytic thinker who seeks logical
coherence in legal argument and in judicial opinions. His jurisprudence is shaped as much by that latter commitment as it is

39. Leon, 468 U.S. at 921 (emphasis added). The same logical analysis of the
incremental deterrent effect of suppression appears in White's opinion for the Court
in New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19-21 (1990) (refusing to suppress incriminating statement made by defendant a t police station after warrantless entry and
arrest at the defendant's home).
40. Liebman, supra note 3, a t 15 & n.8.
41. See, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 643 (1986) (White, J., dissenting);
Attorney Gen. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 916 (1986) (White, J., concurring in the
judgment); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447-50
(1985); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985); New York City Transit Auth. v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 597 (1979) (White, J., dissenting); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.
441, 456, 459 (1973) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (voting to strike down
schedule of tuition fees for state university because of its "bizarre pattern of discrimination" rather than the majority's irrebuttable presumption theory); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 63 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
These cases might be seen as counter-examples to White's oft-noted confidence
in the democratic process and deference to legislative judgments. See, e.g., Rhesa
H. Barksdale, A Tribute to Justice Byron R. White, 107 HARv. L. REV.3, 6 (1993)
("His opinions reflect his unwavering confidence and faith in our majoritarian,
democratic system. He understands the limited role of the courts, especially the
federal courts, in that system, feeling confident that the affairs of our nation are
best managed by its people and their elected representatives."); Stith, supra note 3,
a t 24-25 (noting examples of "White's clear sense of the primacy of democratic
institutions"). Yet an important consequence of striking a law down as irrational
under the Equal Protection Clause (rather than applying heightened scrutiny or
discovering a fundamental right) is that it leaves the legislature free to do almost
exactly the same thing again in the future. While striking down a law may be
meddlesome, if you are going to strike it down the least meddlesome way of doing
so is by using the rational basis standard under the Equal Protection Clause.
42. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass9n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983).

238

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994

by pragmatism and concern for how things work in pra~tice.4~
The attention to the connection between means and ends reflects three characteristics of his jurisprudence: (1) the pragmatic, consequentialist functionalism, which is so often noted;
(2) the inclination to rule narrowly and with regard to the
specific case before him, which is also often noted; and (3) the
rigorous, abstract, intellectually precise concern for logical
coherence. It is this last element that is often overlooked.
The remainder of this Article addresses a particular manifestation of this tendency, what one might call an intellectual
rather than a legal formalism. That is White's use, or, as the
case may be, rejection, of the purely logical proposition that the
greater includes the lesser.
INCLUDES
THE LESSER
11. THEGREATER
The central argument that Congress can restrict the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts-for example, by denying
them jurisdiction in cases concerning school prayer or abortion-is that the Constitution leaves it up to Congress whether
there shall be such courts at
This argument, which has
been around for a long
is an archetypal example of the
argument that the greater includes the lesser. The claim is
that the greater power-not to create the courts in the first
place, or, presumably, t o eliminate them altogether, thus stripping them of all jurisdiction-includes the lesser power of stripping them .of some jurisdi~tion.~~

43. I take Dennis Hutchinson to be adverting to the same twin aspects of
Justice White's approach when he notes that two "hallmarks" of White opinions are
that "practical interests defeat hypothetical risks, and doctrinal structure is logically applied." Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Man Who Once Was Whizzer White, 103
YALEL.J. 43, 53 (1993).
44. Article 111 provides for "one supreme Court, and . . . such inferior Courts
a s the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST.art. 111,
0 1.
45. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850).
46. The Supreme Court has largely avoided this imbroglio. However, Justice
White laid out a close cousin of this argument in Palmore v. United States, 411
U.S. 389 (1973). There a criminal defendant, convicted in the District of Columbia
Superior Court in a trial presided over by a D.C. judge without life tenure, argued
that criminal prosecutions under the D.C. criminal code were federal questions that
could be heard only by Article 111 judges. The Court held that even though the
D.C. criminal code was a federal law, prosecutions thereunder did not have t o take
place in federal court. Part of the rationale was that Congress did not have to
create inferior courts or invest them with the entire jurisdiction authorized by
Article 111. If it did not, i t might still adopt criminal statutes, violations of which
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The greater-includes-the-lesser argument is particularly
associated with Justice Holmes?' In one of its purest expressions, Holmes wrote that "[elven in the law the whole generally
includes its parts. If the State may prohibit, it may prohibit
with the privilege of avoiding the prohibition in a certain
way."48 Note the opening "even i n the law9'-the life of the law
may well have been experience rather than logic, but perhaps
not by much. Logic still counts. Indeed, perhaps nowhere did
Holmes more refute his most famous aphorism than in his
frequent reliance on the argument that the greater includes the
lesser.49

would then be prosecuted in the state courts with non-tenured judges. Such an
outcome would be indistinguishable from what happened here. Id. a t 401-02.
47. See, e.g., Peter Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric of "Rights", 33 UCLA L. REV.
977, 1011 11.87 (1986) (describing Holmes as the "leading spokesman" for the
greater-includes-the-lesser argument); Charles R. Bogle, Note, "Unconscionable"
Conditions: A Contractual Analysis of Conditions on Public Assistance Benefits, 94
COLUM.L. REV. 193, 197 n.14 (1994) (describing Holmes as "the greatest proponent
of this view"). Indeed, Holmes' affection for this view is sufficient to induce Cass
Sunstein to label it "Holmesianism." Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (With Particular Reference to Religion,
Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 597 (1990).
48. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U S . 1, 53 (1910)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
In Western Union, the Court struck down a Kansas statute that conditioned the
State's permission for a foreign corporation to do business in the State on the
corporation's willingness to pay a discriminatory tax based on the corporation's
entire capital stock rather than just its in-state assets. See also Pullman Co. v.
Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 US. 56 (1910). The greaterAesser principle had been
more successhlly invoked in earlier foreign corporations cases. See, e.g., Doyle v.
Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 542 (1876) (holding that State could withdraw
business license because corporation had invoked federal court's diversity jurisdiction; "[ilf the State has the power to cancel the license . . . [ilt has the power to
determine for what causes and in what manner the revocation shall be made").
Western Union is a prominent early application of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, which rejects the greaterAesser principle.
49. A few other examples are worth citing. In the well-known case of Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895), af'd, 167 U S . 43 (1897), Holmes
upheld a conviction for speaking on the Boston Common without a permit. "[Tlhe
legislature may end the right of the public to enter upon the public place by
putting an end to the dedication to public uses. So it may take the less [sic] step
of limiting the public use to certain purposes." Id. a t 113; see also Ferry v.
Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88, 94-95 (1928) (Holmes, J.); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v.
Railroad Comm'n, 271 US. 583, 602 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting); McAuliffe v.
Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (Mass. 1892) (Holmes, J.). In Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), in which the Court struck down congressional
limits on the President's authority to remove a postmaster, Holmes' dissent centered on the f a d that Congress could eliminate the position of postmaster altogether:
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Holmes is hardly the only Justice to have embraced this
reasoning. Among contemporary Justices, Chief Justice
but he
Rehnquist seems to be its most enthusiastic endor~er,~'
is far from alone.51
We have to deal with an office that owes its existence to Congress
and that Congress may abolish tomorrow. Its duration and the pay attached to it while i t lasts depend on Congress alone. . . . With such power over its own creation, I have no more trouble in believing that Congress has power to prescribe a term of life for i t free from
interference than I have in accepting the undoubted power of Congress to decree
its end.
Id. at 177.
Even Holmes, however, drew the line somewhere. When the Court upheld the
Postmaster General's revocation of second-class mailing privileges for a pro-German
newspaper, Holmes dissented: "The United States may give up the Post Office
when it sees fit, but while it carries it on the use of the mails is almost as much
a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues." United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
50. Bogle, supra note 47, a t 199 11.21. A brief catalogue: (1) Given the state's
greater power to ban gambling altogether, it necessarily has the lesser authority to
forbid advertising of legal gambling. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478
U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.). (2) Given that the state need not offer a
person employment a t all and could hire only at-will employees, it has the lesser
authority to limit the permissible bases for termination but rely on sketchy procedures to determine if such a basis exists. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54
(1974) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.) (stating that employees "must take the
bitter with the sweet" in accepting for-cause employment with limited due process
protections). (3) If a plaintiff who rejects a settlement offer and then wins a smaller amount after a trial must pay the defendant's post-settlement-offer costs, then
one who rejects the offer and loses altogether must pay those costs. Delta Air
Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 368 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for "[tlotally ignoring the common-sense maxim that the greater
includes the lesser"); see also United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S.
166, 177 (1980) ("Because Congress could have eliminated windfall benefits for all
classes of employees, it is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to have
drawn lines between groups of employees for the purpose of phasing out those benefits."). The United States Law Week records the following recent exchange between
the Chief Justice and the attorney defending a city ordinance that forbids virtually
all signs:
Why would a rule of one sign per house violate our precedents? Chief
Justice Rehnquist asked.
The government would be imposing a choice on residents a s to which
issue they may speak on, Cherrick responded.
It's better to speak on one issue than none, isn't it? Should you prohibit debate entirely instead? Rehnquist asked.
62 U.S.L.W. 3567, 3568 (Mar. 1, 1994) (reporting oral argument in Ladue v. Gilleo,
NO. 92-1856).
51. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 492 U.S.408, 433 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (reasoning that because Tribe had power to exclude non-members from the reservation
altogether it necessarily had the power to regulate their use of the land through
-
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THE GREATER INCLUDES THE LESSER
Despite its prevalence and appeal, the argument that the
greater includes the lesser must be used cautiously. Carelessly
invoked, it can cover up significant problems.
First, the argument obviously is only valid if in fact the
greater power exists. Otherwise the major premise disappears
and the argument fails by its own terms. The danger of a false
assertion of such a power is not imaginary. After all, the argument rests on a claim about a hypothetical case not before the
court. It carries with it all the risks of deciding without briefs,
arguments, or a concrete set of facts. Put differently, the argument is one form of proceeding by hypothetical, a style of legal
reasoning that has largely fallen out of favor.52 Furthermore,
the supposed greater power may be more theoretical than real.
Seth Kreimer has objected to the Holmesian analysis on the
ground that it too often relies on a n asserted greater power
that would never actually be exercised i n the real world. I n
these circumstances, the government is in every meaningfd
way aggrandizing its power; the supposedly greater power is
actually the lesser, since it is in reality ~ n a v a i l a b l e . ~ ~
I am not certain the practical unavailability of the greater
option is as significant as Kreimer contends. It is more a political than a legal argument. In certain circumstances, those
challenging a particular exercise of government authority will
happily call the government's bluff, willing to run the (mini-

zoning); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987) (Scalia, J.)
(reasoning that "the Commission's assumed power to forbid construction of the
house in order to protect the public's view of the beach must surely include the
power to condition construction upon some concession by the owner, even a concession of property rights, that serves the same end"); South Dakota v. Neville, 459
U.S. 553, 563 (1983) ( O ' C o ~ o r ,J.) (reasoning that since the State could have
required a driver to take a blood-alcohol test, it can give the driver the option to
refuse the test but with the result that his license is revoked and the refusal is
introduced in evidence); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765 (1982) (Blackmun,
J.) (reasoning that since Congress could preemptively have regulated the entire
field of natural gas regulation, it can take the less intrusive approach of allowing
states to regulate on condition that they comply with various federal requirements).
52. See Arthur J. Jacobson, Death of the Hypothetical, 9 STAN.LIT.REV. 125
(1992).
53. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights
in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1313-14 (1984). Kreimer labels this
the argument's most "fundamental failing." Id. at 1313. Though Holmes does not
spell it out, the unlikelihood of the exercise of the greater power may underlie his
unusual rejection of the greater-includes-the-lesser argument with respect to limitations on the use of the U.S. mails. See United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social
Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting); supra note 49.
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mal) risk that the government will exercise its theoretical power to make them even worse off than by the exercise of the
lesser power. This is rather like the prosecutor who chooses not
to have the jury instructed as to a lesser included offense, predicting that it is unlikely to convict on the offense charged and
not wanting t o give it any other option than acquittal. Just as
the mere fact that the attorney is willing t o run the risk does
not mean that the jury cannot convict of the offense charged, so
it is not clear why the unlikelihood that the government would
exercise its greater power means it is unable to exercise the
lesser. Even if the greater power has disappeared for all practical purposes, why did it take the lesser with it? If the question
is whether the Constitution constrains certain activity (the
lesser), the fact that non-constitutionalconsiderations constrain
other, greater measures is beside the point.54
The second obvious error in relying on the greater-includes-the-lesser argument occurs when one proposition is not
in fact "the lesser" of the other. In set-theoretic terms, the
greater includes the lesser if all A's are also B's, in which case
A is a subset of B. But if in fact not all A's are B's, then A is
simply not a subset of B, and "greater" and "lesser"
misdescribes their relationship. Such a difficulty might arise in
the legal setting in determining, for example, whether something is a lesser included offense. If in fact not every element of
the one must be shown to prove the other, then it is not.55
54. As John Garvey writes:
The problem with [the argument that the "greater" option is not in
practice available] is that it confuses "ought" with "can." . . . Think about
the ultra vires doctrine . . . . The charter of X Corporation permits it to
boycott Y Corporation, but X's board of directors would never agree to
such a proposal. The board would agree to buy from Y only at a lower
price. Is this proposal ultra vires? Probably not. If boycotts are OK, less
drastic measures probably are too. It is a question of what the charter
allows. The board's approval has no bearing on that question.
John H. Garvey, The Powers and the Duties of Government, 26 SANDIEGOL. REV.
209, 216 (1989).
I also note that this argument has not been made, to my knowledge, in the
debate over congressional limitations on federal jurisdiction, where it would most
obviously apply. After all, Congress simply is not going to eliminate the lower
t so. But no one has argued that this
federal courts-in practical terms, it c a ~ o do
in and of itself precludes limiting their jurisdiction. Instead, the argument is over
the courts' essential role in the constitutional plan, or the fact that elimination of
the courts would amount to denial of the substantive rights that the courts now
stand ready to vindicate. These are arguments that the greater power does not
exist even on paper, albeit for some of the same reasons that it does not exist in
practice.
55. See, e.g., Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S.705, 716 (1989); In re Niel-
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The third trap of this argument-another way in which the
lesser is not in fact a subset of the greater-is what logicians
call the fallacy of composition, or its flip-side, the fallacy of
division.56The fallacies arise because a set-theoretic approach
is not always valid. In set theory, components or elements of
the set do not interact; they are unaffected by being grouped
together. In the real world this is not necessarily the case. For
example, sodium chloride is a harmless substance (table salt).
But that does not mean that either sodium or chlorine is harmless; because of their interaction the components do not necessarily share the characteristics of the whole, and vice versa.57
In the legal setting, the fallacies of composition and division tend t o take a slightly different form than in abstract logic. The character of components may not change through interaction, but the basic point remains that the parts do not necessarily share the characteristics of the whole. In particular, the
greater may not include the lesser because exercise of the "lesser" power implicates constitutional considerations not present
in the exercise of the "greater" power. In law, this tends to be
true in one of two separate ways. The first involves situations
we tend to think of as equal protections problems, the second
involves "unconstitutional conditions."
As t o the first, in many settings adopting a lesser rather
than a greater measure will raise equality concerns. Consider
the frequent judicial statements, echoing the greater-includesthe-lesser proposition, that the Equal Protection Clause is not
violated by underinclusive regulation because the legislature
can proceed one step at a time.58 This is a significant overstatement. For example, to further its legitimate interests in
reducing traffic congestion, automobile accidents, and air pollu-

sen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
TO REASONING
171-73
56. See STEPHENTOULMINET AL., AN INTRODUCTION
(2d ed. 1984).
57. Id. The conclusion about the harmlessness of sodium and chlorine is an
example of the fallacy of division. The fallacy of composition here would be the
conclusion that sodium chloride is harmful because sodium and chlorine are. Another example of the latter fallacy would be the conclusion that because each individual can decide how she will act, the human race can decide how it will act, for
example by selecting a rate of population growth or choosing between war and
OF PHILOSOPHY169, 173
peace. J.L. Mackie, Fallacies, in 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
(Paul Edwards ed., reprint ed. 1972).
58. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110
(1949) ("It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus
be eradicated or none at all.").
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tion, the legislature could forbid anyone t o own an automobile.
That does not mean, however, that it could forbid women and
not men to own automobiles, notwithstanding the fact that doing so would be a step toward these same permissible goals.
This "one step" toward the solution violates an independent
constitutional principle of equal treatment.5g This is not the
case if the state attacks the worst aspects of the problem first,
as indeed it does by criminalizing drunk driving and outlawing
especially dirty cars through the adoption of emissions standards.
The second type of problem is more complicated. Under the
doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," already "venerable" a
generation ago,60the state may not (at least it may not without a compelling interest) condition a benefit-welfare, research funds, employment-on the recipient's not exercising a
constitutional right? Not all applications of the greater-includes-the-lesser argument involve unconstitutional conditions,
and not all arguably unconstitutional conditions trigger the
greater-includes-the-lesserargument. Nonetheless, if the greater includes the lesser, then there should be no doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. As we have seen,62this was Justice
Holmes' view. To quote his most famous non-liberal First
Amendment comment: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right t o be
In other words, since New Bedford had no oba p~liceman."~~
ligation to hire McAuliffe at all (alternatively, he had no right
59. Many other examples of this general equality principle are possible: a
state need not use grand juries, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975), but if
it does it cannot select the jurors in a racially discriminatory manner, Rose v.
Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555-56 (1979); a state need not (at least in theory) provide
appellate review of judicial decisions, but if it does so it cannot deny appellate
review to certain types of litigants, Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 125 (1972)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); a state need not elect government oflticials, but if it
does, it is severely limited in how it can restrict the franchise, Kramer v. Union
Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966).
60. See John D. French, Comment, Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis,
50 GEO. L.J. 234, 234 (1961) (referring to "the venerable doctrine of unconstitutional conditions").
61. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 US. 364 (1984); Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359 11.13 (1976) (plurality opinion); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
62. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
63. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892); see
also cases cited supra note 49.
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to city employment), then surely it could offer him the job conditioned on his agreeing not to talk politics. The arrangement
only puts McAuliffe in a better position than he had been in,
and the State has not compelled him to forgo his constitutional
rights. The Holmes position has fallen out of favor, however. As
long as one concedes that some conditions are unconstitutional,
and there is unanimous agreement as to that, though huge disagreement as to why and which ones, then the greater does not
always include the lesser.
My goal is not t o elaborate a theory of unconstitutional
conditions; we are adequately supplied with those already.64
More narrowly, we can discuss why the simple assertion of the
principle that the greater includes the lesser is not a satisfactory response t o the argument that a condition is unconstitutional. The basic reason is that there is a qualitative difference that
is ignored by the quantitative perspective of the greater-indudes-the-lesser. The logical defect was explained in Thomas
Reed Powell's 1916 article, The Right to Work for the State.65
Rejecting the Holmesian position regarding regulation of foreign corporations, Powell explained that the power to exclude
out-of-state corporations from doing business in the state at all

64. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory
of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELLL. REV. 1185 (1990); Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State
Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV.4 (1988); Kreimer, supra note
53; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1413
(1989); William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1968). See generally Unconstitutional
Conditions Symposium, 26 SANDIEGOL. REV. 175 (1989).
It may be that there is no such thing as an unconstitutional conditions doctrine as such. Cass Sunstein asked in the title of one article whether there was.
Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a n Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine?, 26 SANDIEGO
L. REV. 337 (1989). He entitled his next article Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism, see Sunstein, supra note 47, implicitly answering
the question raised by the first. In the second article, Sunstein accepts the existence of such a doctrine, but only to argue that it should be abandoned. In fact
there is nothing to abandon but a label. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine
does not exist as such, any more than there is a "doctrine of unconstitutional congressional arrogation of power" or a "doctrine of unconstitutional fines." In some
circumstances, certain conditions are unconstitutional. As Sunstein states, "[a] welfare program limited to Democrats is unconstitutional because of the first amendment; points about voluntary participation and the 'greater power' are simply a
diversion. Courts do not need an unconstitutional conditions doctrine in order to
make the necessary response." Id. at 606 (footnote omitted); see also Westen, supra
note 47, at 986.
65. Thomas R. Powell, The Right to Work for the State, 16 COLUM.L. REV.
99, 111 (1916).
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does not "include" the power to allow such corporations to do
business subject to whatever condition the state chooses to
impose. Powell illustrated the fallacy syllogistically:
Mqjor Premise. There i s a class of corporations "A" (foreign corporations doing intra-state commerce) over which the
state has the power of absolute exclusion.
Minor Premise. The X corporation is an "A"corporation.
Conclusion. Therefore the X corporation is one upon
which the state has power to impose any burden whatsoev-

The logical defect here, explains Powell, is the "fallacy of
four terms": the predicate in the major premise is different
from the predicate in the conclusion. Moreover, the relation
between the two is not that of a whole and its parts; not every
member of the class of "imposing any burden whatsoever" is a
member of the class of "absolutely e~cluding."~'
Though he does not distinguish them, Powell is identifying
two sorts of defects of the greater-includes-the-lesser argument.
One is that the actions identified as the "parts" are not in fact
all within the whole. The second is that while the challenged
action may indeed be a "part" of a permissible "whole," an independent constitutional prohibition may apply to the part and
not the whole. For example, Powell observes that just because
the state might impose the death penalty for treason does not
mean it can impose a lesser but cruel and unusual punishment
such as torture? Here the point is that there is a qualitative
66. Id. a t 110.
67. Id. a t 111.
68. Id. a t 108 n.22, 111 11.31. This example is more complex than Powell
indicates, and nicely illustrates the qualitative/quantitative distinction. On the one
hand, one could argue that Powell's premise is mistaken: torture is not "less" than
capital punishment. We know that precisely because the relevant standard-the
Eighth A m e n d m e n t i s itself essentially quantitative, proscribing the extreme punishments. On this view, if indeed torture violates the Eighth Amendment and the
death penalty does not, that means that execution is lesser and torture greater according to the relevant yardstick and Powell's argument is wrong. On the other
hand, one could say that the Eighth Amendment, with its concern with what is
"cruel and unusual," is concerned with the character of punishment, not its
amount. Certain bizarre punishments would be forbidden even if everyone agreed
they were milder than other permissible punishments, in which case Powell's argument works quite well.
Powell's real point, incidentally, is not about a constraint such as the Eighth
Amendment a t all; it is about equality. His broader argument is that the fact that
a state might forgo public works projects and not hire a n y o n e t h a t is, there is no
right to state employment as such-does not mean that the Equal Protection
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difference between the "greater" and the "lesser" that, whatever
their quantitative relation, means that only the latter implicates a constitutional p r ~ t e c t i o n . ~ ~
Let us restate these points about equal protection and
unconstitutional conditions in the language of the greater-includes-the-lesser argument. Even where the greater power
undeniably exists and the lesser is undeniably a subset or part
thereof, there are three ways i n which the "lesser" may i n fact
be the "greater."
First, and most important, the consequences of the "lesser7'
step may in fact exceed those of the greater or trigger constitutional concerns absent in the case of the exercise of the greater
power. For example, allowing men to drive but not women
looks "lesser7'in that it denies cars to some rather than all, but
it becomes greater when we also consider the harms it imposes
other than denying cars. A stigmatic and practical harm to
women occurs not from being denied cars per se, but from being denied cars when men are allowed to have them. This may
make the total harm greater than would result from a n acrossthe-board ban. Similarly, to borrow one of Seth Kreimer's examples, consider the difference between a municipality's decision to maintain whites-only swimming pools and its decision
to have no swimming pools a t all. While the latter superficially
looks like the exercise of a "greater7' power, its negative consequences are in fact "lesser." The harm to blacks from being
selectively excluded would be greater than the benefit to whites
of being able to swim." This is most obviously a n equal proClause is inapplicable to discriminatory state hiring decisions. See id. at 104-12,
especially 108.
69. Although the examples in this Article will primarily involve questions of
constitutional authority, that reflects the Supreme Court's docket more than an
inherent characteristic of the argument. For example, consider the problem of the
good samaritan. The greater-includes-the-lesser argument would be that if you
c a ~ o be
t held liable for refusing to go to someone's aid at all, you cannot be held
liable for going to the person's aid and botching the job. The greater indifference
would include the lesser. Yet the common-law rule is the opposite. The usual justification is that by going to someone's assistance, the samaritan may discourage
others from doing so and induce reliance by the victim; therefore it becomes more
important that the samaritan assist properly than that he assist at all. Put in
terms of the greater including the lesser: there is a qualitative difference between
the "greater" and the "lesser," since only the latter affirmatively denies the victim
assistance she might otherwise receive. Similarly, the common law imposes liability
if the defendant, though under no obligation to act, acts negligently and leaves the
plaintiff in a worse situation. Here the greaternesser argument does not apply because inaction would have been "lesser."
70. Kreimer, supra note 53, at 1312-13; see also Palmer v. Thompson, 403
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tection point-indeed, it is a costbenefit justification for the
Equal Protection Clause. But a case such as Sherbert u.
Verr~er,~*
involving the Free Exercise Clause, could be analyzed in the same way.72Similarly, making content-based distinctions as t o what speech t o allow may have more serious
consequences by skewing the market, than would an exercise of
the "greater" power of an across-the-board ban, which eliminates more speech but does so neutrally.
The second way in which the "lesser" may be "greater" or
a t least different turns on the nature of the two. Because it is
unacceptably dangerous to drive either very fast or very slow,
superhighways have both a minimum and maximum speed
limit. Knowing that the speed limit is 55, one might argue that
because the greater includes the lesser it must be permissible
to drive 30. This is false. Concerns inapplicable to the greater
conduct forbid the "lesser." By the same token, it would be a
similar, and similarly invalid, greaterflesser argument to say
that since 40 is fast enough, 80 must be as well. The point is
that a separate set of concerns renders the greater and the
lesser apples and oranges, even though they look like big apples and little apples. In many cases an independent constitutional prohibition, such as the Free Exercise clause in Sherbert,
will prohibit the exercise of a "lesser" power.
The third way in which the argument breaks down turns
on the government's justifications for its actions. Even where
the act truly is lesser in its effect on the individual, we must
still inquire whether the state's interests are as strong as those
supporting exercise of the greater power. For example, it can be
argued that if Congress can legislate substantively in a particular area, then it may take the milder step of simply providing a
federal forum for state-created rights in that area. In Textile
Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills,73Justice Frankfurter rejected this reasoning. "Surely the truly technical restrictions of Article I11 are not met or respected by a beguiling
phrase that the greater power here must necessarily include

U.S. 217 (1971) (upholding city's decision to close rather than integrate its swimming pools). Palmer is discussed at infia notes 138-139 and accompanying text.
71. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (striking down state law denying unemployment benefits to Sherbert, who had been fired for refusing to work on her Sabbath, because
she had unjustifiably failed to accept suitable work).
72. See Westen, supra note 47, at 1012.
73. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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the lesser."74 Frankfurter did not elaborate as to why the
greater-includes-the-lesser argument does not work here. At
least part of the explanation should be that the federal interest
in providing a forum is far greater in the case of a federal
claim than in the case of a state claim.75Thus, in terms of the
intrusion on state authority, to open the federal courts to state
claims is "less" than supplanting state law altogether, but if
the federal interest justifying that step is proportionately even
smaller then the first might be unconstitutional even though
the second is not.76
THAT THE
111. JUSTICEWHITE'SUSE OF THE ARGUMENT
GREATER
INCLUDES
THE LESSER

While I have not attempted any comprehensive survey, it
is my impression that Justice White is attracted to the argument that the greater includes the lesser. The argument appears in some of his best-known and strongest opinions. For
example, it is at the center of his dissent in Chadha:
If Congress may delegate lawmaking power to independent and Executive agencies, it is most difficult to understand
Art. I as prohibiting Congress from also reserving a check on
legislative power for itself. Absent the veto, the agencies receiving delegations of legislative or quasi-legislative power

74. Id. at 474 (Frarkfbrter, J., dissenting).
75. Scott A. Rosenberg, Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U.
L. REV.933, 961 11.134 (1982).
76. Peter Westen offers a different example of the same reasoning. In Bagley
v. Harvey, 718 F.2d 921, 924 (9th Cir. 1983), the Ninth Circuit held that a state
may condition a prisoner's parole on his agreeing not to travel to his home town.
Since the state could simply keep him in prison, thus denying him any freedom of
movement a t all, it surely had the lesser power to let him out of prison but not
allow him to go to one place. Westen points out, however, that the question here
is whether the state's interests outweigh the prisoner's constitutional right to travel. The mere fact that the state could wholly infringe that right while the prisoner
was in custody cannot be dispositive, for the state no longer has the same strong
justification for close confinement once the parolee is out of prison. Westen, supra
note 47, a t 994-95.
Westen's criticism does not demonstrate that the court's result was wrong in
this case. The state may well have powerful reasons for keeping the parolee away
from his home town; one could imagine that doing so was a principal aim of his
imprisonment. Westen does show, however, that the court erred in simply relying
on the greater-includes-the-lesser argument without more. This example also implies, incidentally, that there is no such thing as an unconstitutional conditions
doctrine. The constitutional analysis is the normal balancing of individual right
versus state interest that obtains whether or not the case is said to involve an
unconstitutional condition.

250

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994

may issue regulations having the force of law without bicameral approval and without the President's signature. I t is thus
not apparent why the reservation of a veto over the exercise
of that legislative power must be subject to a more exacting
test.77

It is the basis for his concurrence in RA.V. v. City of St.
Paul ,78 disagreeing with the majority's conclusion that St.
Paul could not outlaw only some fighting words:
It is inconsistent to hold that the government may proscribe
an entire category of speech because the content of that
speech is evil, but that the government may not treat a subset of that category differently without violating the First
Amendment; the content of the subset is by definition worthless and undeserving of constitutional p r o t e ~ t i o n . ~ ~

And it pops up briefly and innocuously in many opinions along
the way: "If there is no First Amendment privilege to refuse t o
answer the relevant and material questions asked during a
good-faith grand jury investigation, then it is a fortiori true
that there is no privilege to refuse t o appear before such a
grand jury . . . .?>SO
There is no foolproof way of finding all the opinions in
which Justice White relied on the argument that the greater
includes the lesser, and deciding whether the argument has
been invoked can be something of a judgment call. I know of
about two-dozen such opinions; no doubt there are more.
On the other hand, Justice White is not wedded to this
formulation. He has ignored it in some circumstances when it
might have been available, and rejected it when others have
invoked it. The most prominent example is his rejection of
Justice Rehnquist's "bitter with the sweet" argument in procedural due process cases. The Rehnquist position is that because
the state is free not t o establish a substantive entitlement (for
example, a for-cause standard for dismissing state employees)
in the first place, it must also be free t o create the entitlement
but limit it by defining the procedures for its deprivation."

77. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 986-87 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
78. 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2550 (1992) (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
79. Id. at 2553 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
80. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U S . 665, 708 (1972) (White, J.).
81. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1974) (plurality opinion of
Rehnquist, J.).
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Justice White consistently refused to endorse this classic greater-includes-the-lesser formulation, and then authored the opinion for the Court that decisively rejected it.82
This Part analyzes a sampling of opinions in which White
used or abjured the greater-includes-the-lesser argument. I
should say at the outset that the focus on the use of this argument is misleading. None of the opinions I discuss rest solely
on the greater-includes-the-lesser argument. My purpose is not
to analyze or even give a full account of these particular opinions, but t o examine Justice White's use of a particular argument. In any given case that argument may be only a small
piece of his entire reasoning.

A. Lesser Included Offenses
In at least one setting black-letter law holds that the greater includes the lesser: lesser included offenses in criminal law.
For example, under the Double Jeopardy Clause a conviction
for a lesser included offense bars later prosecution for the
greater offense and vice versa.83 Determining whether an offense is jeopardy-barred involves a straightforward, set-theoretic determination of whether the quantitative relationship holds.
The danger of a qualitative shift in the nature of the elements
is absent. Thus, the validity of the greater-includes-the-lesser
argument hinges on whether the asserted set-theoretical relationship holds. Justice White's opinions in this setting are
careful and precise.
For example, in Illinois u. vitale8* the defendant had
caused a fatal automobile accident. Writing for the Court, Justice White found no double jeopardy violation when the State of
Illinois first prosecuted Vitale for failure t o reduce speed, and
then, on the basis of the same accident, for involuntary manslaughter. Because manslaughter did not necessarily entail
proof of failure t o reduce speed, the mere possibility that the
state would seek to rely on the elements of the lesser offense
did not bar prosecution for the greater offense. The same sort
of rationale underlies White's opinion in Morris u. mat hew^.'^
There the state appellate court, finding that the defendant had
been convicted of a jeopardy-barred offense, reduced the convic82.
83.
84.
85.

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 164-69 (1977).
447 U.S. 410 (1980).
475 U.S. 237 (1986).
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tion to one for a lesser included offense that was not jeopardybarred. The Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the jury
necessarily had found that the defendant's conduct satisfied all
the elements of the lesser included offense.
In Biles v. Watkin~,8~
as in Morris v. Mathews, a state
appellate court had reduced a conviction to one for a supposedly lesser included offense. The defendant had been convicted of
felony capital murder, the underlying felony being kidnapping.
The Mississippi Supreme Court had found insufficient proof of
the kidnapping; the felony murder conviction therefore could
not stand, and the court instead imposed a conviction of simple
murder on the ground that it was a lesser included offense that
did not rest on the commission of a separate felony. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Dissenting from the denial,
Justice White pointed out that felony capital murder may be
committed "without any design to effect death,"87 whereas
simple murder requires "a deliberate design to effect . . .
death."88 The supposedly "lesser included" offense thus required proof of an element not necessary for conviction of the
greater offense and therefore could not be imposed by the reviewing court.
The same firm, logical analysis is present in White's dis~
was consent in the 5-4 decision in Schad v. A r i ~ o n a ?Schad
victed of first-degree murder. The prosecution proceeded on
both premeditated- and felony-murder theories (Schad had
stolen the victim's car). The judge refused Schad's request for
an instruction on robbery as a lesser included offense, but did
instruct on second-degree murder. The jury convicted of firstdegree murder without specifying, or being asked to specify,
whether it had convicted on the premeditated- or felony-murder
theory. In an opinion by Justice Souter, the majority held that
the refusal to instruct on robbery was not unconstitutional. A
defendant is entitled t o a lesser included offense instruction in
a capital case because of the possibility that a jury, convinced
that the defendant had committed some violent crime but not
convinced that he was gullty of a capital crime, might, without
such an instruction, go ahead and convict of the capital offense

86.
87.
CODE8
88.
89.

441 U.S.953 (1979) (denial of certiorari).

Id. at 953 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting MISS.
97-3-19(2)(e) (1972)).
Id. (quoting MISS. CODE8 97-3-19(1)(a) (1972)).
111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991).
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if the only alternative was a~quittal.'~
The requirement of an
instruction on a third option besides acquittal or conviction of a
capital offense was satisfied here by the possibility of conviction on second-degree murder; the jury was not faced with an
all-or-nothing choice.
White's dissent rested on two propositions. First, robbery is
a lesser included offense of felony murderlrobbery. The State
contended that felony murder has no lesser included offenses.
White pointed out, irrefutably, that "[iln the case of a compound crime such as felony murder, in which one crime must
be proven in order to prove the other, the underlying crime
must, as a matter of law, be a lesser included offense of the
greater."" Second, second-degree murder is not a lesser included offense of felony murder; therefore the charge on that
offense was only a third option beside acquittal or conviction of
premeditated murder. In short, the second-degree murder
charge did not provide the constitutionally required third option besides conviction of felony murder and acquittal.g2
Schad shows Justice White pursuing a logically rigorous
analysis, focusing on the set-theoretical relationship of the
elements of other crimes. It is the majority that takes the more
"functional," good-enough-for-government-work
approa~h.'~
One final case bears mention. The question in United
~ whether a conviction for criminal conStates v. ~ i x o n 'was
tempt barred a subsequent prosecution for the criminal offense
that was the basis of the contempt conviction. One of the defendants had been subject t o a civil protection order forbidding
him t o assault his estranged wife; after doing just that he was
tried for criminal contempt for violating the order, then on
charges of assault and assault with intent to kill. The majority
90. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 642-43 (1980).
91. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2512.
92. Id.
93. Justice Souter's response to White was that a jury would not be so "irrational" as to convict of capital murder rather than second-degree murder if it
was unconvinced that the defendant had committed either first- or second-degree
murder but was convinced he had committed robbery and so did not wish to let
him off the hook entirely. There is something to this point as a purely descriptive
matter. But if the evidence truly was insufficient to show that the defendant had
deliberately killed the victim, while still indicating some violence and a theft, the
charge closest to what the evidence established would be felony murder. (It is still
true that this assumes that the jury is willing to ignore its reasonable doubt instructions so far as to convict for felony murder, but not ignore its instructions on
the elements of offenses so far as to convict for second-degree murder.)
94. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
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held that the prosecution for simple assault was jeopardybarred, since assault had t o be proved to establish violation of
the protective order, but that prosecution for assault with intent to kill was not. White pointed out that simple assault was
a lesser included offense of assault with intent to kill. Given
the jury's opportunity to convict of any lesser included offense,
and the likelihood that it would receive an instruction on the
lesser included offense even if it was not charged, the
majority's position amounted t o a rule that "while the government cannot, under the Constitution, bring charges of simple
assault, it apparently can . . . secure a conviction for simple
assault, so long as it prosecutes Foster for assault with intent
to kill. As I see it, Foster will have been put in jeopardy twice
for simple assault."g5
In each of these cases, Justice White carefully and correctly applied a quantitative, greater-includes-the-lesser analysis,
determining whether in fact the necessary overlap of the two
offenses existed.96B. First Amendment Cases
The most complex and interesting cases in which Justice
White has relied on the argument that the greater includes the
lesser have arisen under the First Amendment. Here White has
repeatedly argued, usually in dissent, that a particular law is
constitutional because it interferes with speech less than would
a broader prohibition that is concededly constitutional.
The most recent and prominent of these cases is R.A.V. u.
City of St.
This was a challenge to a city ordinance
making it a crime to
place[] on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to,
a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resent-

95. Id. at 2878 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
96. See also Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 158 (1977) (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); cf Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2717 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (noting oddity of punishing possession of narcotics as severely as possession with intent to distribute, since
the first is a lesser included offense of the latter).
97. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
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ment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender.98

As interpreted by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the ordinance
reached only speech that qualified as "fighting words" under
Supreme Court cases holding that such speech is unprotected
by the First A~nendment.~~
Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority struck down the ordinance on the ground that it was a
content-based regulation of speech. Scalia relied on the extensive caselaw establishing that, if we know nothing else about
the First Amendment, we know that it prohibits the government from allowing some speech and forbidding other speech
solely because of agreement or disagreement with its content or
viewpoint.
Justice White's opinion concurring in the judgment100
took a completely different tack, resting first and foremost on
the greater-includes-the-lesser argument. Under the Court's
longstanding categorical approach to First Amendment cases,
the ordinance prohibited unprotected speech. The fact that it
did not apply to all unprotected speech did not make it invalid;
the fact that St. Paul could forbid all fighting words (the greater power) established that it could forbid some fighting words
(the lesser power).
To borrow a phrase, [the majority's] . . . "simplistic, allor-nothing-at-all approach to First Amendment protection is
at odds with common sense and with our jurisprudence a s
well." It is inconsistent to hold that the government may
proscribe an entire category of speech because the content of
that speech is evil, but that the government may not treat a
subset of that category differently without violating the First
Amendment; the content of the subset is by definition worthless and undeserving of constitutional pr~tection.'~'

98. St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE
292.02 (1990), quoted in RA.V., 112 S. Ct. a t 2541.
99. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.568 (1942).
100. The opinion was a concurrence in the judgment because Justice White
also considered the statute unconstitutional. While completely rejecting the
majority's approach, White concluded that the statute was overbroad, reaching
some protected speech notwithstanding the narrowing interpretation of the state
supreme court. RA.V., 112 S. Ct. a t 2558-59 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
101. Id. a t 2553 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted)
(quoting id. a t 2543 (majority opinion of Scalia, J.)).
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Amendment cases, they are equal protection cases. More precisely, the First Amendment argument is answered by the
greater-includes-the-lesserresponse; the question that remains
is one of equality, not freedom of speech.lo6 I will consider
each in turn.
1. Selective regulation within an unprotected category
The central case here is R.A.V. However, White's R.A.V.
approach was anticipated by his opinion for the Court in New
York v. Ferber,lo7which upheld a state prohibition on child
pornography. White distinguished child pornography from other
non-obscene sexual materials on the ground that the state had
a compelling interest in protecting minors who participated in
the production of these materials (a rationale that White realized applied only to photographs and films, not written descriptions). Because of the harm to minors, child pornography fell
into a new unprotected category. White then made quick work
of the defendant's underinclusion argument: because child
pornography was unprotected speech was such an argument
was by definition unavailable.'" Under the greater-includesthe-lesser approach, underinclusion objections automatically
fail. None of the concurring opinions took issue with this reasoning although it is, of course, exactly White's argument in
R.A.V.
From a straight set-theoretic perspective, this approach is
sound. To stick with the R.A.V. problem, the regulated fighting
words are a subset of the (unprotected) category of all fighting
words and therefore must themselves be unprotected. The key
objection to the analysis, and the one Scalia dwells on, is that
there is an independent constitutional prohibition on the exercise of the lesser power here. Yet given the Court's categorical
oriented) shift in methodology will often not apply. As an illustration, in addition
to this set of cases and those discussed supra notes 13-21, see also David H.
Taylor, The Forum Selection Clause: A Tale of Two Concepts, 66 TEMPLEL. REV.
785, 831-32 11.266 (1993) (noting that all the Justices who had participated in a
1972 case and were still on the Court for a similar 1987 case "saw fit to take a
different approach to the issue without sufficient explanation as to why their previous opinion was not controlling, in need of reversal, or distinguishable. Only Justice White's position [reflected in a separate concurrence in the first case] has some
logical consistency.").
106. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2555-56 & n.9 (1992)
(White, J., concurring in the judgment).
107. 458 US. 747 (1982).
108. Id. at 765-66 & n.18.
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approach to the First Amendment it is hard to say that that
Amendment is such an independent prohibition. (At the very
least, it is hard to see why content-based distinctions between
unprotected speech merit strict scrutiny.) By definition the
regulation applies to (and exempts some) speech that is of so
little value as to merit no First Amendment protection at all.
The equality-based concern that always arises here is addressed by Justice White under the rubric of the Equal Protection Clause, and he concludes that the legislature could reasonably have decided that the speech it forbade was especially
problematic.
Interestingly, Justice White did not bring up what may be
the strongest greater-includes-the-lesserargument in response
to the majority. Scalia argues that if the state is going t o proscribe fighting words, it must proscribe all of them; it cannot
pick and choose. Yet if that is the case, why is the line drawn
at fighting words, the specific category of unprotected speech
relevant under the Court's cases? Why isn't the statute still
fatally underinclusive because it does not outlaw all unprotected speech? Under Scalia's rationale, it should be unconstitutional to prohibit all fighting words but not, say, the dissemination of information vital t o national security; that would be
content-based discrimination, and the fact that fighting words
are constitutionally unprotected would make no difference
given the decision to prefer other unprotected speech to fighting words.logThus Scalia implicitly assumes that the greater
does include the lesser: the state can forbid some but not all
unprotected speech. He never explains why the magic categories are those on the standard list of unprotected speech.
Still, White's greater-includes-the-lesser logic is not completely dispositive. White is in general hardly super-sensitive to
First Amendment values and could be accused of shortchanging
those values here, notwithstanding the protection that should

109. Two responses are possible. First, perhaps St. Paul does forbid all unprotected speech except fighting words that are not hate speech. Even if i t does, however, one c a ~ o learn
t
it from the majority opinion. Second, some sort of secondary-effects argument may be available here; the legislature could reasonably conclude that the harms flowing from fighting words are more severe than those flowing from, say, revealing classified information, not because it likes the message of
classified information better. Yet it's not clear why that argument is not equally
applicable to the St. Paul ordinance. Cf. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194
(1993) (upholding state law that enhances criminal penalties when victim is selected because of race).
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be afforded by the company he kept-Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens. White does not fully address concerns
about government manipulation of the free speech marketplace.
Even when the government is preferring some unprotected
speech t o other unprotected speech, the fact of government
preference must give us pause.
As a thought experiment, suppose the ordinance had forbidden all fighting words except those that "arouse anger,
alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion or gender." Under Justice Scalia's analysis, nothing changes; this is still a content-based distinction within an
unprotected category and so unconstitutional. Is it also the
same case under White's approach? The hypothetical tests our
intuitive comfort with the result of White's approach in R.A.V.
itself. As a First Amendment matter, such a law must be constitutional for White. The forbidden speech is unprotected;
underinclusion is therefore irrelevant. However, I do not believe he would vote to uphold it. Rather, he would strike it
down on equal protection grounds. The objection to this approach would be that evaluating such a law under the Equal
Protection Clause instead of the First Amendment lowers the
level of scrutiny. A statute as perverse as this hypothetical one
would not survive, but many others would.
The "equal protection component" of the First Amendment
might be strong enough to require more searching scrutiny of
unequal regulation even of unprotected speech. Professor
Kagan concludes that content-based underinclusion should not
trigger strict scrutiny but that viewpoint-based underinclusion
(either direct or in effect) should.l1° Her argument is powerful. Whether it is ultimately right or not need not be resolved
here. But it does suggest that the shortcoming of White's opinion is that it gives short shrift to the possible harms of contentor viewpoint-based regulation of unprotected speech.
2. Selective funding of speech
This type of case resembles those involving selective regulation of unprotected speech in that here again the speaker has
no right to the subsidy, just as the speaker has no right t o
engage in unprotected speech, but the objection lies in the
selective exercise of the state's undoubted power (to forbid

110. Kagan, supra note 102, at 58-73.
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unprotected speech, to refuse to subsidize). During his Supreme
Court tenure, White was rather silent in these cases. He generally joined opinions of other Justices that were consistent with
his position in R.A.V., rejecting challenges to selective subsidies
or conditions on subsidies. For example, he joined Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion in Rust v. Sullivan, upholding a
federal prohibition on the use of federal funds for abortion
counseling. Likewise, he joined Rehnquist's dissent in FCC u.
League of Women Voters,"' which argued that the government could forbid radio stations receiving public funds from
endorsing political candidates or editorializing.ll2 For
Rehnquist this was a viewpoint-neutral limitation on how government funds will be spent.
White's votes in these cases may be overdetermined. They
can be explained as reflections of his narrow understanding of
First Amendment rights. But they also are consistent with his
general confidence in the greater-includes-the-lesser proposition
and his consistent application of it in First Amendment cases.
3. Time, place, and manner restrictions

City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.l13 involved a municipal ordinance under which the Mayor had discretionary authority t o grant permits for newsracks on public
property. Using Kagan's categories, this is a case involving the
selective application of time, place, and manner restrictions. In
an opinion by Justice Brennan, a 4-3 majority invalidated the
ordinance as a prior restraint that gave the authorities unbridled discretion to engage in content-based discrimination
against protected expre~sion."~So characterized, the case
was easy. Justice White rejected the characterization, however.
For him, this was not constitutionally protected expression; the
city could ban all newsracks. Therefore, as in R.A.V., in which
the city could ban all fighting words, the possibility of govern-

111. 468 U.S. 364 (1984). But see Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland,
481 U S . 221 (1987) (parting company with Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White
joined Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court striking down a sales tax that applied to some publications but not others rather than Justice Scalia's dissent).
112. Rehnquist himself has not shown the same consistency between the different settings in which the content-based underinclusion problem arises, having
joined Justice Scalia's opinion in RA.V.
113. 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
114. Id. at 772.
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ment-drawn distinctions within the unprotected category was
not threatening. l5
Justice Brennan expressly rebuked Justice White for relying on the "discredited" greater-includes-the-lesser argument? Justice White denied that he was using such a n
analysis a t all.'l7 The denial is odd; it seems inescapable that
Justice White was using this argument. What he was not doing, however, is using it in its "discredited," Holmesian form.
Not every exercise of the lesser power would be automatically
valid. White acknowledged, for example, that the City could not
grant newsracks only to Republicans. Because this was a facial
challenge, however, it was unnecessary and inappropriate to
anticipate mayoral abuse of that sort. White's position was
exactly that repeated in R.A.V. (and, for that matter, in Rust):
allowing some speech and rejecting other speech is not per se
impermissible under the First Amendment if none of the
speech is protected.ll8
Justice White's statement that the city could not grant
newsrack licenses only to papers owned by a particular political
115. Id. at 784 (White, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 762-69.
117. Id. at 785-86 (White, J., dissenting).
118. White's major premise-that the city could forbid newsracks altogether-is
not necessarily correct. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Borough Council, 381
F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (striking down ban on newsracks); Sandra L. Cobden,
Note, Passive Communication in Public Fora: The Case for First Amendment ProtecL. REV. 191 (1990) (arguing that a complete ban on
tion of Newsracks, 12 CARDOZO
newsracks in a public forum would be unconstitutional). If i t is mistaken then the
argument collapses.
For another example of White's reliance on the greater-includes-the-lesser argument in the public forum setting, see Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (White, J.) (reasoning that because the Parks Service
was under no obligation to allow a 24-hour vigil of protest on the Mall in Washington, D.C., it necessarily had the power to allow the vigil but refuse to allow
participants to sleep in their tents).
A slight variation on Lakewood surfaced during White's last Term on the
Court. I n City of C i n c i ~ a t v.
i Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993), the
Court struck down a n ordinance that allowed newspapers to use newsracks but
forbade "commercial handbills" to do so. The Court saw this as a content-based
regulation that drew a distinction Raving nothing to do with the (concededly legitimate) aesthetic and safety concerns that underlay the ordinance. Justice White did
not write a n opinion but joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent. Id. at 1521.
Rehnquist argued that the Court had often upheld underinclusive regulations of
commercial speech and justified the commerciaVnoncommercial distinction of the
ordinance on the ground that the former enjoyed greater First Amendment protection. Echoing Justice White's Lakewood dissent, he noted that the city could order
the removal of all newsracks and described himself a s a t a loss to understand why
the ordinance was unconstitutional because it did not limit more speech.
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party is notable. On the surface it conflicts with the strong
version of the greaterAesser argument that he made in R.A.V.
Two explanations for this arguable inconsistency are possible.
First, it might be that for Justice White the greater-includesthe-lesser argument disposed of any First Amendment objections, but racial or political distinctions would have been un~
constitutional under the Equal Protection C l a ~ s e . " Alternatively, White's position may be that equality requirements of
the First Amendment are stronger when.speech is not in a n
unprotected category, such as fighting words. This is consistent
with his emphasis in R.A.V. on the complete lack of value of
the proscribed speech and the basic doctrinal proposition, with
which he does not quarrel, that a regulation can be upheld
with a reasonable time, place, and manner limitation only if
content-neutral.
This second explanation, although never clearly articulated
by Justice White, seems to me descriptively the most accurate
and analytically the soundest. It reconciles White's dissent in
Lakewood with his plurality opinion in Metromedia, Inc. v. City
of San Diego,l2' which to a large extent presaged the disagreements between the Justices in Lakewood. A city ordinance
outlawed all outdoor advertising signs, with the exception of (a)
on-site signs identifying the resident or advertising goods made
on the premises and (b) a fairly narrow list of twelve types of
signs, such as time and temperature signs and for-sale signs.
With White writing for a four-Justice plurality, the Court
struck down the ordinance as to noncommercial messages but
upheld it as to commercial messages. The city could apply its
ban to commercial signs, given the reduced protection enjoyed
by commercial speech. As applied to non-commercial speech,
however, the ordinance came to grief in two respects, both
growing out of the exceptions to the general ban. First, the exception for on-site signs designating the name of the owner or
resident of the premises or advertising goods manufactured a t
the premises, amounted to a broad exception for commercial
speech without a n equivalent exception for non-commercial

119. Some of White's language supports this reading: selling newspapers
through newsracks "does not involve the exercise of First Amendment protected
freedoms," but racial or political distinctions "would be clearly violative of the First
Amendment (or some other provision of the Constitution)." City of Lakewood, 486
U.S. at 786 (emphasis added).
120. 453 U.S.490 (1981).
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speech. This privileging of commercial speech was constitutionally backward. In effect the ordinance treated the less protected
category better than speech i n the more protected category.
Second, the twelve specific exceptions violated the general
requirement of content-neutrality. Because the distinctions
were content-based, the law could not be upheld a s a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation.lZ1
How would the greater-includes-the-lesser argument have
operated here? We need not wonder, for Justice Stevens employed just that argument in his dissent. He objected that the
plurality "concludes that the ordinance is a n unconstitutional
abridgment of speech because it does not abridge enough
speech."122Disagreeing with Justice Brennan, Stevens argued
that a total ban on billboards would be constitutional because
ample alternative channels of communication would remain
available and the restriction would not in its intent or effect be
especially burdensome for a particular subject or message.
Because a total ban would be acceptable, a ban with some exceptions must also be acceptable, since its burden on communication is less serious than wouid be that of a total ban and the
exceptions are not keyed to a particular subject or message. lZ3
4. Non-public fora

White has taken the same approach to speech in a nonpublic forum. Thus, in Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local
White wrote the opinion for the
~~
Educators' A ~ s ' n , 'Justice
Court upholding a school district's limitation of its interschool
mail system to messages from the teachers' certified bargaining

121. Id. at 516-17 (plurality opinion of White, J.). Justice Brennan, joined by
Justice Blackmun, concurred in the judgment. He portrayed the law as a total ban
and voted to strike it down because the asserted state interests in traffic safety
and aesthetics were inadequate to outweigh this across-the-board ban on a particular medium of communication. Id. at 527-40 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
122. Id. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); see also supra note 50 (describing oral argument in LaDue v. Gilleo, No. 92-1856).
123. Metromedia, Inc., 453 US. a t 542 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
Stevens's position here is quite close to Professor Kagan's; content-based
underinclusion is acceptable, viewpoint-based underinclusion receives strict scrutiny.
Oddly, Stevens did not take this approach in RA-V., writing an opinion for himself
only that focused on the relative harms flowing from the prohibited and permissible speech.
124. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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representative and denying it to a rival union. Because the
mail system was not a public forum, reasonable "distinctions in
access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity" that
would be "impermissible in a public forum" were "inherent and
inescapable" and "wholly consistent with the District's legitimate interest i n 'preserv[ing] the property . . . for the use to
which it is lawfully dedi~ated.""~
5. Content-basedregulation of protected speech

This should be the easy First Amendment category. The
most basic tenet of First Amendment doctrine is that the government cannot choose which speech to permit and which to
forbid on the basis of content.lZ6 This principle will often be
inconsistent with the greater-includes-the-lesser argument. An
across-the-board ban might well be acceptable, but a contentbased selective prohibition will not. White characterized
Metromedia as such a case. It is an uncomplicated instance of
where the greater-includes-the-lesser argument fails because a
separate constitutional prohibition forbids the exercise of the
lesser power but not the greater."'
The Court is not always careful in avoiding the greaterAesser argument in light of the prohibition on content-based
regulation. For example, in New York State Liquor Authority v.
B e l l ~ n c a , 'it~ ~upheld a state law forbidding topless dancing
where liquor is served. Were topless dancing unprotected activity, the case would be easy; even if not within the police
power (which it surely is) or a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause (which it almost certainly is not), the regulation
is within the power granted to the states by the Twenty-First
Amendment. The problem is that topless dancing is protected
activity. The per curiam opinion simply ignored that fact, rea125. Id. at 49, 50-51 (quoting United States Postal Serv. v. Council of
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 130 (1981)).
126. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARYL. REV. 189 (1983).
127. See also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2473 (1991)
(White, J., dissenting) (arguing that prohibition of public nudity was unconstitutiona l a s applied to nude dancing because it drew "a line between expressive conduct
which is regulated and nonexpressive conduct of the same type which is not regulated" and so triggered strict scrutiny); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 593 (1983) (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (arguing that a use tax on paper and ink products was invalid because it applied only to a few newspapers).
128. 452 U.S. 714 (1981) (per curiam).
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soning that the "power to ban the sale of alcoholic beverages
entirely includes the lesser power to ban the sale of liquor on
premises where topless dancing occurs."129 Yet the TwentyFirst Amendment cannot automatically authorize a state t o
allow some expressive activity where alcohol is sold (plays, the
opera, comedians, music) and not others. Only Justice Stevens
dissented, but he was surely correct in arguing that the Twenty-First Amendment does not trump the First.lso After all,
the Twenty-First would not sustain a law that allowed the sale
of liquor to whites but not blacks. The balance of interests may
be different here, but the need to consider the First Amendment is no less than the need to consider the Fourteenth in
that case. Here is one instance where White joined (or conceivably wrote) an opinion with a clear abuse of the greater-indudes-the-lesser argument.

C. "Content-Based Underinclusion"
Outside the First Amendment
The same principle behind the First Amendment opinions
can be seen in other White opinions in which he makes the
greater-includes-the-lesserargument and rejects any equalitybased responses. For example, in New York v. United
States,13' the majority distinguished cases rejecting similar
Tenth Amendment/federalism challenges t o federal
statutesls2 on the ground that in those cases Congress had
regulated both the states and private entities identically. The
law at issue in New York applied only to the states. White re~
jected the distinction as not "logically ~ o u n d , " 'arguing:
[Tlhe Court makes no effort to explain why this purported
distinction should affect the analysis of Congress' power under general principles of federalism and the Tenth Amendment. The distinction, facilely thrown out, is not based on any
defensible theory. . . . An incursion on state sovereignty hardly seems more constitutionally acceptable if the federal statute that "commands" specific action also applies to private
parties. The alleged diminution in state authority over its

129. Id. at 717.
130. Id. at 718-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). The case is summarized supra note 9.
132. E.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U S . 528 (1985).
133. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2441 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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own affairs is not any less because the federal mandate restricts the activities of private parties.134

White's rhetoric here is not exactly that of the greater and
the lesser, for he does not present it as an instance in which
the challenged action is "lesser" than the permissible one. Instead he states that the two are the same. Nonetheless, the
point is the same as in the First Amendment cases. The substantive intrusion, whether on First or Tenth Amendment
rights, is identical regardless of how or whether it affects others. If it violates state sovereignty to force the state to take
title t o low-level radioactive waste, then it violates state sovereignty; whether the regulation applies t o others is simply irrelevant. The underinclusion-here, regulating only states rather
than states and private entities alike-is constitutionally irrelevant.
In most circumstances this approach leaves equality concerns unaddressed. However, given the peculiarity of a state
asserting equal protection rights and the solid reasons for applying the take-title obligation only to states, those are very far
removed here.
Without getting buried in the merits of this case, we might
still note where White might have been mistaken. As in the
First Amendment cases, the argument would be that he failed
to acknowledge a normatively relevant aspect of underinclusion. Suspicion is generally appropriate if the outcome of the
political process is to concentrate burdens on one major loser. If
legislation must apply equally t o states and private interests
alike, then that is some protection against such ganging up.
Moreover, by ensuring that the states have some political allies, it would guarantee that the theory that states can protect
themselves through the political process'35 actually holds up
in practice.
The same sort of criticism can be made of White's use of
the greater-includes-the-lesser argument in Chadha, where
that argument is used in a more straightforward way. The relevant passage is quoted above? White's point is that if Congress can hand its legislative responsibilities over to the Attorney General entirely, it must be able to hand them over almost

134. Id.
135. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-54.
136. See supra text accompanying note 77.
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entirely, retaining some role for itself through the legislative
veto. Yet a basic argument against congressional delegation is
that policy decisions should be made in a visible manner by
accountable officials. Delegations dilute accountability. If this is
our concern, then White's implicit response is that it can only
increase accountability to have the legislative veto; a little
congressional involvement is better than none. The problem is
that accountability may be even further diluted by the legislative veto. It is always harder to pin down responsibility when
its exercise is shared and invisible.13'
Again, this Article is not going to take on the vitality of the
Tenth Amendment or the constitutionality of the legislative
veto. My only point is that without more the greaterflesser
argument is usually incomplete. As discussed in Part 11, it is
subject to misuse often enough that its use generally requires
some explanation of why it is appropriate. In New York u. United States and INS u. Chadha there are a t least plausible arguments that the "lesser" power may actually be the "greater" in
that it creates even more of the problems associated with the
"greater" than does the exercise of that power itself.

D. Moving from the Lesser to the Greater
A peculiar wrinkle on this style of argument is provided by
Palmer u. T h o m p s ~ n , ' ~
in~ which the Court, over Justice
White's dissent, upheld the decision of Jackson, Mississippi t o
close all its public swimming pools in the face of a judicial
order to desegregate them. The situation might be seen as a
classic greater-includes-the-lesser problem. Suppose Jackson
segregates its pools. It argues that since it is not required to
provide pools at all, it must be permitted to provide pools but
on certain conditions, or only to certain people. Invoked to
support racial classifications, that argument would be unanimously rejected; indeed, this case only arose because courts
had found Jackson's segregated pools unconstitutional. It is a
stark example of the central fallacy of the greater-includes-the-

137. One of the stronger aspects of Chief Justice Burger's opinion was his
account of how the veto operated in practice. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 923-28
(1983). Although this was totally irrelevant to his stated theory of the case, and
although he relied in a somewhat obfuscatory fashion on its use in cases other
than Chadha's, Burger's account is responsive to White. Indeed, it is the functionalist response to the most formalistic aspect of White's opinion.
138. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
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lesser argument; quantitative change may also involve a qualitative change.
The fact that the greater does not include the lesser here
seems to suggest that the majority was correct in Palmer. The
Court properly did not assume a correspondence of the whole
and the parts, realizing that just because the lesser was invalid
did not mean that the greater was as well. The error would
have been one of composition rather than division, but the
principle is the same.
Was Justice White incorrect, then, in linking the lesser and
the greater in Palmer, in failing to recognize that they were
different? I think not. The heart of his dissent was a focus on
"evidence of invidious purpose or motive"13gand the fact that
closing all pools involved precisely the same stigmatizing message about black inferiority present in the decision to segregate
pools. In short, in these circumstances, the greater did include
the lesser; "composition" was not a fallacy.
Another example of the same form of reasoning is Justice
White's dissent in Ingraham v. Wright.140 There the Court rejected Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment challenges to corporal punishment of schoolchildren. It held that the Eighth
Amendment simply does not apply to school discipline; by "punishment" the Amendment refers only to criminal sanction^.'^^
Justice White disagreed. If, he reasoned, there are some punishments that are so barbaric that they may not be imposed for
the commission of crimes-those acts that society designates as
the most thoroughly reprehensible a person can commit-then
similar punishments may not be imposed on persons for less
culpable acts, such as breaches of .school rules. If it is unconstitutional to cut off someone's ear for committing murder, it
must be unconstitutional to cut off a child's ear for being late to
class.14'
Like the Palmer v. Thompson dissent, this is a greaterincludes-the-lesser argument, but not in the normal direction.
Prohibition of the lesser necessarily implies prohibition of the

139. Id. at 241 (White, J., dissenting).
140. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
141. Id. at 668-71. As to the due process claim, the Court held that while
students had a liberty interest in being free from corporal punishment, after-thefact state tort remedies provided all the process that was due. Id. at 672-74, 67680.
142. Id. at 684 (White, J., dissenting).
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greater; if the government cannot do X, then it cannot do
2X. 143
The primary objection to White's reasoning would be the
usual one: that the shift from greater to lesser (or, as here,
from lesser to greater) is not simply quantitative but qualitative. That is one way of describing the majority's claim that
what happens in schools does not count as "punishment." To
illustrate, suppose we accept Ingraham and reverse the argument. Say the state sought t o impose corporal punishment for
theft. It might argue, citing Ingraham, that if the state can
impose such punishment on school pupils it surely can impose
it on criminals, where the justification is greater and the harm
slighter. Among the objections to this argument would be the
standard one that the greater does not include the lesser here
because a particular constitutional prohibition-the Eighth
Amendment-applies to the lesser (because it is criminal punishment) and not the greater. For present purposes, we need
not resolve the dispute over the meaning of "punishmentyyin
the Eighth Amendment. I would make only two points. First,
White's use of the greater-includes-the-lesser argument (or,
more precisely, the argument that the lesser is included within
the greater) is wholly appropriate here given his premises.
Second, that argument is at least relevant, though not dispositive, to the question of the scope of "puni~hment,'~
because it
helps achieve an overall legal regime of principle and coherence.
A second objection to White's reliance on the greaternesser
idea is also possible. Precisely because of the deep societal
approbation of, say, murder as compared to its view of, say,
tardiness for class, a prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is less necessary in the school discipline setting than in
the criminal justice setting. It is not at all clear, however, that
(setting aside vigilante justice) the state does in fact have a
greater tendency to go overboard in punishing criminals than
in punishing schoolchildren.

143. Another example in a White opinion is Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.665
(1972), in which the Court held that reporters could be required to appear before a
grand jury.
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E. White Opinions Rejecting Greater /Lesser Arguments
Justice White's last opinion for the Court was in United
~
a statute proStates u. Edge Broadcasting C O . , ' ~upholding
hibiting the broadcast of any lottery advertisement by a radio
station located in a state without a state-run lottery. The Solicitor General argued that because Congress and the states had
the power to outlaw lotteries altogether, they necessarily had
the lesser power to forbid the advertising of 10tteries.l~~
Without explanation, Justice White declined to address that issue,
proceeding instead with a straightforward application of the
commercial speech decisions. The opinion is a farewell reminder that (as we saw in Metromedia) White was by no means
fixated on the greater-includes-the-lesser argument.146This
section looks at some of the other situations in which he has
rejected this approach.
1. The greater power does not exist

The first requirement of any greater-includes-the-lesser
argument is, of course, that the major premise is correct, i.e.

144. 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
145. The argument derives directly from t h e d u s t i c e Rehnquist's opinion upholding Puerto Rim's ban on casino advertising. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S.328 (1986).
146. In my view the government's argument in Edge was flatly wrong and the
Court appropriately refused to go down that path. In the speech cases discussed in
Part III.B, supra, the greater power was always a power to curtail speech. Here
the asserted greater power is a general regulatory authority over (constitutionally
unprotected) conduct. The concern over the sort of qualitative shift that undoes the
greaterAesser argument should thus be far greater.
I n this situation a constitutional prohibition applies to the exercise of the supposedly lesser power that does not apply to the exercise of the greater. As one
judge with impeccable conservative credentials has written about the Posadas dictum on which the government relied: "[IN is not clear that the power to regulate a
specific economic activity necessarily comprises the power to regulate speech about
that activity. After all, the Constitution does not forbid legislation abridging the
freedom of gambling; it does forbid legislation abridging the freedom of speech."
Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's m i d of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L.
REV. 627, 649 n.74 (1990).
The point is clearest if one posits a law that forbids public discussion or "abstract advocacy" of gambling or lotteries. No one would make the greater-includesthe-lesser argument as to such a law. The appropriateness of that argument is no
greater when the forbidden speech is advertising. Even though under the commercial speech cases one might plausibly uphold the prohibition of advertising and not
of abstract advocacy, the usual First Amendment analysis is still required. Indeed,
this application of the greater-includes-the-lesser approach would in effect eliminate
constitutional protection of commercial speech.
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that the greater authority does indeed exist. This is the simplest and most direct basis on which to reject any particular
application of the argument. Justice White himself is open to
that criticism in the Lakewood case, although the substantive
issue is one far beyond my interests here.'47 In at least one
case, White rejected a greater-includes-the-lesser argument on
this basis. In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakina Indian Nation148the question was whether an Indian
tribe could impose its zoning regulations on non-Tribe members
who owned land within the reservation. There was no opinion
for the Court. In one opinion, Justice Stevens relied on the
treaty between the United States and the Tribe to argue that
the Tribe had the authority wholly to exclude outsiders from
the reservation, and therefore necessarily possessed the authority to allow them into the reservation but regulate their use of
land therein.'*' Justice White seemed sympathetic t o
Stevens's greater-includes-the-lesser approach, but he rejected
the premise.150 Notwithstanding the treaty, the Tribe lacked
power to exclude from lands that, pursuant t o federal statute,
had been sold in fee to non-members of the Tribe. The greaterincludes-the-lesser argument collapsed because the greater
power simply did not exist.
Seth Kreimer has argued that the greater-includes-thelesser argument should be unavailable whenever the government would never in fact exercise a purely theoretical greater
authority.151 In essence, this argument is that (de facto rather than de jure) the supposed greater authority does not exist.
As discussed above, this may not be such a telling criticism of
the argument.152But in any event I am unaware of Justice
White ever relying on a purely theoretical greater power. To
the contrary, in Chadha, for example, he argued that if Congress can hand over legislative decisionmaking in its entirety to
an agency it must be able to hand it over almost completely, retaining a veto.153 Standardless delegations are of course a
fact of life in the administrative state, and the "greater power"

See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
492 U.S. 408 (1989).
Id. at 433 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 423-27 (opinion of White, J.).
Kreimer, supra note 53, at 1313-14.
See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.919, 986-87 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
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to which White referred was the power that the majority was
endorsing, indeed requiring.
White's reliance on real rather than theoretical greater
powers is not surprising. As discussed in Part I, all of White's
jurisprudence rests there? The logical approach I am discussing in this Article is not divorced from the functionalism on
which others have focused; the two are not just consistent, they
are interconnected, and each operates ii the service of the
other.'55
2. The public forum

The public forum doctrine, which limits government's authority to control the use of its own property, is itself a rejection of the greater-includes-the-lesserargument. After all, one
could argue that because the government need not create
parks, sidewalks, post-offices and so on in the f i s t place it
must therefore have the lesser authority to create them but
limit their use. So Justice Holmes (of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court) argued in Davis.'56 The legal conclusion that certain property is a public forum is the logical conclusion that the greater does not include the lesser. But why
doesn't it? In the terms of Part 11, two things seem to be at
work. First, if the greater-includes-the-lesserargument is defective when there is no realistic possibility that the government will exercise its theoretical greater power, the public
forum cases are an excellent example. The government is not
going to eliminate parks and sidewalks altogether. Second, the
state's justification for its exercise of the lesser power is weaker
than that for its exercise of the greater power.''' The reasons
for not having streets and p a r k e l a t e d t o expense, resource

154. See supra notes 2-12 and accompanying text.
155. Cf Allan Ides, Letter to the Editors, NEW REPUBLIC,May 10, 1993, at 4,
4 (noting that Justice White sought "not to promote particular ideologies, but to
decide cases in a pragmatic way that permits the political branches to shoulder
primary responsibility for governing our society" and that the goal of an opinion
was "to decide the case in an intellectually and analytically sound manner") (emphasis added).
156. "[Tlhe legislature may end the right of the public to enter upon the public place by putting an end to the dedication to public uses. So it may take the
less [sic] step of limiting the public use to certain purposes." Commonwealth v.
Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895), affd, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
157. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
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allocation, and opportunity costs-are not applicable to denying
their use for First Amendment activity once they exist.
By accepting the public forum doctrine at all then (which
concededly is hardly a radical move) White properly rejects a
strong version of the greater-includes-the-lesser idea. Still,
while by no means contending that there was no such thing as
a public forum, and not writing many opinions in this area,lss
White consistently voted with whichever set of Justices took
the narrower view of the scope of the public forum
doctrine.159 This is of course consistent with his relatively
narrow understanding of First Amendment rights; it is also
consistent with the greater-includes-the-lesseridea. One wonders whether his relatively unsympathetic view of public forum
arguments might not stem at least in part from the fact that
the whole idea of the public forum is inconsistent with the
argument that the greater includes the lesser.

3. Equality
In McLaughlin u. Florida,160Justice White wrote the
opinion for the Court striking down Florida's prohibition on
interracial fornication. Separate statutory provisions forbade
(1) adultery, (2) unmarried cohabitation or "open and gross
In
lewdness and lascivious behavior," and (3) fornicati~n.~~'
addition, another provision made it a crime for "any white
person and negro, or mulatto" to "live in adultery or fornication
with each other" and for any such couple to "habitually live in
and occupy in the nighttime the same room."162The appellants were found guilty of violating this last section. A unani-

158. In addition to Perry, his best-known opinion for the Court in a publicforum case is Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
US. 640 (1981)' which also rejected a First Amendment challenge.
159. See, e.g., International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112
S. Ct. 2701 (1992) (White joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the majority
upholding airport ban on solicitation); Lee v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2709, 2710 (1992) (White joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist's dissent from per curiam opinion striking down airport ban on the distribution of literature); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (White
joined Justice K e ~ e d y ' sopinion upholding ban on loud music in park); Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (White joined Justice Stewart's opinion upholding military base regulations forbidding political demonstrations and requiring headquarters
approval for the posting of any publication).
160. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
161. Id. at 185 n.1.
162. Id.
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mous Court reversed the conviction under the Equal Protection
Clause. This predecessor to Loving u. Virginia1" is barely a
footnote in the history of the Court's cases concerning racial
discrimination. However, it is a stark (and easy) illustration of
equality concerns overriding the greater-includes-the-lesser
argument. The Court did not even hesitate with regard to the
state's power to forbid adultery and fornication generally. But
the Court did not conclude that because the state can forbid all
such behavior (as indeed it had), it must be able to forbid some.
That argument does not work:
This is not . . . a case where the class defined in the law is
that from which "the evil mainly is to be feared," or where the
"lelvils in the same field may be of different dimensions and
proportions, requiring different remedies," or even one where
the State has done as much as it can as fast a s i t can. That a
general evil will be partially corrected may a t times, and
without more, serve to justify the limited application of a
criminal law; but legislative discretion to employ the piecemeal approach stops short of permitting a State to narrow
statutory coverage to focus on a racial group. Such classifications bear a far heavier burden of justifi~ation.'~~

Three points can be made about this passage. First, it is
stylistically typical of Justice White: restrained, deadpan, not
especially memorable, but clear, fum, and useful. Second, it is
methodologically typical, reflecting a heavy reliance on precedent and care not to go further than necessary.165Third, and
most relevant to present purposes, it avoids the one-step-at-atime trap. The greater-includes-the-lesser argument only works
if the resulting selective treatment can be justified. Here it
obviously cannot; especially seen from 1994 the point is not a
subtle one. But the awareness of equality concerns in the greater-includes-the-lesser setting is constant in White's opinions.

163. 388 US. 1 (1967) (striking down Virginia anti-miscegenation statute).
164. McLaughlin, 379 U.S.at 194 (citations omitted).
165. In both style and method, Justice Stewart's more stirring and condemning
concurrence is a strong contrast. Id. at 198 (Stewart, J., concurring).
166. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2556 & n.9 (1992)
(White, J., concurring in the judgment).
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4. Substance and procedure
The most prominent example of Justice White rejecting the
greater-includes-the-lesser argument is in the procedural due
process setting. The Due Process Clause applies only when
there is a deprivation of "life, liberty or property."167Life and,
t o some extent, liberty have meanings independent of the requirements of positive law, but the definition of "property" is
wholly a matter of positive law. Thus, the antecedent requirement triggering due process is left entirely up to the state:
it can choose to create a property right in a particular interest
or not. If the state has the power to create or not to create
property in the first place, it would seem also to have the lesser
power t o define the procedures for the deprivation of those
property interests it does create. In the much-quoted phrase of
Chief Justice Rehnquist, it can force the property owner to
"take the bitter with the sweet."168
The government employment cases illustrate the argument. The government can create a property interest in employment by limiting the permissible bases for termination. But
it need not do so; should the state choose to hire at-will employees, nothing in the Constitution would forbid it, and then
the Due Process Clause would not apply t o termination, since
no property interest would be at stake?' If the government
can make an employee terminable at will, then logically it
should be able to place the employee in a better position by
adopting a for-cause standard for termination though specifying
procedures for termination that fall short of "due process."
Commentators have generally seen this logic as irrefutable.170
Indeed, this is logic that Justice White and others have
accepted in other settings. The procedural due process problem
has a counterpart in the criminal area. Here too the Constitu-

167. U.S. CONST.amends. V, XIV, $ 1.
168. Arnett v. K e ~ e d y 416
,
U.S. 134, 152-54 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., joined by
two other Justices on this point).
169. Compare Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972),
with Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
RABKIN,JUDICIAL
COMPULSIONS:
HOW PUBLICLAWDIS170. See, e.g., JEREMY
TOWS PUBLIC
POLICY 135 (1989) (stating that "the logical implication" of leaving
the definition of property to the state is that the state is likewise free to determine the level of due process protection); Karen H. Flax, Liberty, Property, and the
Burger Court: The Entitlement Doctrine in Transition, 60 TUL. L. REV. 889, 918-19
(1986) ("[Sltrictly speaking, the entitlement doctrine does entail Rehnquist's 'hitter
with the sweet' theory.").
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tion imposes procedural limitations through the Due Process
Clause but leaves it to the state t o define the substantive predicates for the deprivation of life, liberty, or property. For example, the state has the authority to define the elements of the
crime of murder; the Due Process Clause then imposes the
procedural obligation to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt.17' However, the state can accept that burden by
defining something (for example, sanity) as an element of the
crime, or avoid it by defining the same element (now insanity)
as an aff"1rmative defense and so requiring that the defendant
prove it. As long as the Constitution is silent as to the elements
of the crime or the need for a particular affirmative defense,
which it generally is, then the state can allocate burdens of
proof as it sees fit. Indeed, a greater-includes-the-lesserargument supports this conclusion: the state need not create a particular affirmative defense in the first place, it therefore has
the lesser power to create the defense but place the burden of
proving it on the defendant.
This argument has been stated most squarely by Chief
Justice Rehnquist,'" but can also be found in Justice White's
~~
Patterson a
opinions, particularly Patterson v. New Y ~ r k . 'In
defendant who had been convicted of murder challenged the
state's requirement that he had to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence "extreme emotional disturbance" in order to reduce the crime to manslaughter. He argued that under In re
Winship the state had to prove the absence of extreme emotional disturbance beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice White reasoned that the state was under no constitutional obligation to
expand the old common law defense of heat-of-passion in the
way it had; that it had done so only because it could place the
burden of persuasion on the defendant; and that the state was
not faced with the all-or-nothing choice of either recognizing no
The greatsuch defense or having to disprove its e~istence.'~~
171. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
172. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 633 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). The defendant in Lockett had argued that in order
to impose the death sentence the state had to consider all possible mitigating factors and to prove their absence beyond a reasonable doubt. ThenJustice Rehnquist
made quick work of the latter argument: "Because I continue to believe that the
Constitution is not offended by the State's refusal to consider mitigating factors at
all, there can be no infirmity in shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant
when it chooses to consider them." Id.
173. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
174. Id. at 206-10.
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er-includes-the-lesser argument is more implicit than explicit;
but lurking beneath the surface is the idea that the fact that
the state did not have to create the defense in the first place
means that it can create it but adopt a procedural rule that in
effect renders the defense less helpful to or protective of the
defendant.'75
The bitter-with-the-sweet theory is not obviously different.
Nonetheless, Justice White has consistently rejected Chief
Justice Rehnquist's argument,'76 and authored -the opinion
for the Court in the decision that finally flatly rejected it,
Cleveland Board of Education v. L~uderrnill.'~~
The easy way out of the "positivist trap"'78 revealed by
the bitter-with-the-sweet argument would be to hold that the
greater power in fact does not exist. This might be done in
three ways. First, if the entitlements doctrine were rejected,
then the states would not be free to define "property" for purposes of the Due Process Clause. Indeed, there is a sort of a
greater-includes-the-lesser argument against the entitlements
doctrine: if the Constitution removes the "lesser" power of determining procedures for deprivation from the state, then surely it must also remove the greater power of defining the substantive scope of the entitlement. However, while the
entitlements doctrine has received a quite hostile scholarly
re~eption,'~~
neither the Court as a whole nor Justice White
in particular has shown any sign of being ready t o abandon it.
Second, the greater power does not exist if the Constitution
or natural law imposes affirmative obligations on the state t o
create or respect certain property rights. Some scholars make

175. Justice Blackmun has described the Patterson rationale in exactly these
terms: "[Slince the State constitutionally could decline to recognize the defense a t
all, i t could take the lesser step of placing the burden of proof upon the defendant." Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 681 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see
also McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 444 (1990) (White, J., concurring)
(joining Court in setting aside requirement that jury be unanimous i n finding mitigating circumstances, but writing separately to note that state can place burden of
persuasion as to mitigating circumstances on the defendant).
176. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488-94 (1980) (White, J.); Bishop v. Wood,
426 U.S. 341, 355-61 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
572-84 (1975) (White, J.); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 177-86 (1974) (White,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
177. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
178. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 6 1 B.U. L. REV. 885, 888-93 (1981).
179. For one of many examples, see the discussion and citations in Cynthia R.
Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM189 (1991).
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such a n argument, and in some of the takings cases under the
Fifth Amendment the Court seems hesitant to yield the state
a n unfettered power to define property. However, the Court has
been wholly reluctant to discover affirmative rights in the Constitution in general1'' or to adopt a substantive due process
regime in which individuals would have affirmative rights to
property, "new" or old.181
Third, the greater power might be said to exist in theory
only. Even if this objection to the greater-includes-the-lesser
argument is valid, however, it does not apply in all the procedural due process cases. While it is quite certain, for example,
that the federal and state governments could not in practice
eliminate "welfare" across the board, they can and do make
significant adjustments to the relevant programs.
Accepting the existence of the greater power to define substantively protected interests, then, why doesn't the State have
the lesser power to define the procedures by which it deprives
those interests it deigns to create? Loudermill gives only a
partial explanation:
[Tlhe Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive
rights-life, liberty, and property+annot be deprived except
pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures. The categories of substance and procedure are distinct. Were the rule
otherwise, the Clause would be reduced to a mere tautology.
"Property" cannot be defined by the procedures provided for
its deprivation any more than can life or liberty.182

Several ideas seem to be a t work here. One is purely practical.
This passage comes close to a concession that the Court has
backed itself into a corner with the entitlements doctrine. To
avoid writing the Due Process Clause out of the Constitution
insofar as it protects property the Court had to reject the bitter-with-the-sweet idea. The Constitution inescapably anticipates some limits on the procedures by which the state deprives property; if no process was "due" then the Clause is
meaningless.

180. See generally Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88

MICH. L. REV.2271 (1990).
181. See Colin S. Diver, The Wrath of Roth, 94 YALEL.J. 1529, 1542 (1985)
L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS
IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE(1985)).
(reviewing JERRY
182. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
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Furthermore, reconsider the criminal procedure cases discussed above. The Rehnquist position in a case like Lockett is
that because the state need not provide for consideration of
mitigating circumstances a t all, it is free to place the burden of
persuasion on the defendant. Note that he does not generalize
the point. Applying the bitter-with-the-sweet doctrine t o criminal cases would mean that because the state is free to define
the elements of a crime it is free to determine the procedures
by which those elements are established. Even Rehnquist does
not believe that, and very thick books about constitutional
criminal procedure show that the Court does not. The state's
freedom t o establish the substantive grounds for depriving life
or liberty does not include the lesser power to determine the
procedures for doing so.
The criminal setting may be distinguishable from procedural due process settings such as welfare benefits or government
employment. Life and liberty, unlike property, have a constitutional meaning separate from state positive law; positive law
only defines when they will be lost. In the property setting
positive law does double duty: it simultaneously defines what is
property and establishes the substantive basis for the deprivation. This distinction does not defeat the criminal law analogy,
however. For one thing, the requirements of constitutional
criminal procedure apply even where the sanction is only a
criminal fine, which deprives the defendant of something (money) that is only property because positive law says it is. Moreover, the power to define the elements of a crime, even though
distinct from the power to determine what constitutes the protected interest that will be deprived as a consequence of committing the crime, is nonetheless a "greater" power than the
authority to determine procedures. Therefore, the bitter-withthe-sweet argument should still apply.
Finally, the insistence in Loudermill that substance and
procedure are distinct recalls the example in Part I1 about
maximum and minimum speed limits on the superhighway? Although they are enormously interconnected and the
rules of one always have consequences for the other, substance
and procedure are distinct. To invoke the vocabulary of this
Article, there are important qualitative differences between the
"greater" and "lesser" powers here. Regardless of the state's au-

183. See supra p. 22.
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thority to define the scope of substantive entitlement, process
serves important and distinct functions-both in ensuring accuracy and in serving more amorphous "process values"-that
would be lost in the easy calculation that the greater includes
the lesser.
IV. CONCLUSION
The argument that the greater includes the lesser is often
valid, but slippery and dangerous. If its underlying assumptions-that the greater power really does exist, that the lesser
power is really included within it, and that there is no qualitative difference between the two-are unexamined, the argument is easily misused. Whenever the argument is invoked,
those assumptions must be investigated.
A few reservations and a few conclusions with regard to
Justice White. First, I have not necessarily shown that Justice
White had a particular fondness for this argument. Maybe
what I have shown is only that he sat on the Court for thirtyone years. That's a long time, during which a Justice is likely
to trot out any particular argument more than once. Again, I
have not done any thorough research into the relative frequency with which different Justices invoke this argument, which is
a standard lawyer's and judge's move. I can only say that I
come away from this examination convinced that the greaterincludes-the-lesseris an important idea for Byron White.
Second, I have not necessarily shown that this argument
affected the way White decided cases. It may only have affected
the way he wrote opinions. As always the overlap of the stated
argument and the underlying bases of the decision is uncertain.
In my view, Justice White generally follows where the argument leads. He may think there is something wrong with the
argument if it leads him to the wrong place, and therefore
rethink it, but argument and logical consistency are important
to him. But if you think ideology explains decisions and opinions are always ex post rationalizations, I have said nothing to
convince you otherwise.
Third, as I said at the outset, the foregoing account is
misleadingly incomplete. It is not by any means a full picture
of White's jurisprudential method. I offer it as only a part of
the picture, and a small part at that, but a neglected one.
What, then, does this tell us about Byron White's jurisprudence? I would stress three things. First, it reminds us of his
analytic, logically rigorous approach to legal argument. For all
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the focus on White's real-world pragmatism and desire for
facts, it is equally important to White to think things through
to ensure a logical coherence. Indeed, the strongest criticism of
his opinions in the cases I have discussed is that they are not
functionalist enough. By invoking this logical approach, White
avoids considering hard questions about how things operate in
practice: does selective limitation of unprotected speech in
practice skew the free speech marketplace, even though it is
"less than" a broader but more neutral restriction? Does the
legislative veto in practice decrease accountability, even though
it is "less than" a broader delegation from elected to unelected
officials? And so on.
Second, these cases show that White was much more sensitive to equality arguments than t o arguments about absolute
limits on government power. Where he ignores a possible greater-includes-the-lesser argument it is usually because he is
sensitive to the equality issues. When he accepts the argument,
it is with a recognition that there may be equality objections. lS4
Finally, Justice White's treatment of the proposition that
the greater includes the lesser shows care and precision in his
thinking, a nonideological approach t o deciding cases, and a
striking consistency of his method. In these characteristics, it is
a wholly typical example of his work.

184. The same dynamic can be found in White's consistent rejection of First
Amendment challenges to campaign finance laws. On the one hand, White was unsympathetic to the First Amendment argument, on the other, he stressed the need
for equal opportunity for participation in the democratic process.

